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THE TAKINGS PROJECT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRESS SO FARt 
Douglas T. Kendall* and Charles P. Lord** 
Attorney General Meese . .. had a specific, aggressive, and it seemed to 
me, quite radical project in mind: to use the takings clause of the Fifth 
Amendment as a severe brake on federal and state regulation of busi-
ness and property. 
-Charles Fried, Solicitor General for President Ronald Reagan.! 
INTRODUCTION 
While numerous commentators have documented and attempted to 
explain the dramatic changes that have occurred in takings law over 
the last decade,2 few have examined in any detail the questions of how 
t c Community Rights Counsel, 1998. 
* Executive Director, Community Rights Counsel, Washington, D.C.; B.A., J.D., University 
of Virginia. 
** Adjunct Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Executive Director, The Watershed 
Institute, Inc.; B.A., Yale University; J.D., University of Virginia. The authors thank James E. 
Ryan for his assistance in drafting and editing this Article and Michael C. B1umm, Peter J. 
Byrne, John D. Echevera, and Joseph L. Sax for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1 CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND 
ACCOUNT 183 (1991) [hereinafter ORDER AND LAW). 
2 See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L. J. 1077 (1993); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden 
Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393 (1991); Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint 
on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 473 (1991); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, 
77 CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1989); Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1731 (1988); Nicholas Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and Justice, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1714 (1988); Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross 
Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988). The authors have, 
in prior pieces, joined this debate. See generally Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying" 
for the Change: Using the Eminent Domain Clause to Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 1801 (1995); Douglas T. Kendall, Note, The Limits to Growth and the Limits to the Takings 
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and why this doctrinal shift has taken place. These are the questions 
to which this Article turns. 
The genesis for this Article, and the research that supports it, was 
an observation: many of the changes in takings law that have taken 
place over the last 11 years correspond quite closely to a blueprint for 
takings doctrine proposed by Professor Richard Epstein in his now-
famous book called Takings, Private Property and the Power of Emi-
nent Domain (Takings).3 This observation, while by no means origi-
nal,4 was, to us, both remarkable and troubling. After all, Epstein's 
work was almost universally criticized (if not ridiculed) by the legal 
academy5 and Epstein's proposed end result-the overturning of a 
century's worth of health, safety, and economic regulation6-would 
sink this country in a constitutional crisis as serious as that brought 
about by the economic due process jurisprudence of the Lochner-era 
Supreme Court.7 
How then is it that Epstein's work is having such a widespread 
influence on the development of takings law? What we found is a large 
and increasingly successful campaign by conservatives and libertari-
ans to use the federal judiciary to achieve an anti-regulatory, anti-en-
vironmental agenda. Looking first at the courts and judges deciding 
the most important and influential takings cases, we noted several 
striking patterns. The vast majority of important victories achieved 
by developers in takings cases over the last decade have been decided 
by the same three courts: the United States Supreme Court, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal 
Claims. Moreover, almost without exception, the judges on these 
Clause, 11 VA. ENVT'L L.J. 547 (1992); Charles P. Lord, Note, Stonewalling the Malls: Just 
Compensation and Battlefield Protection, 77 VA. L. REV. 1637 (1991). 
3 RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN (1985) [hereinafter TAKINGS]. 
4 While we provide in Section IV what is perhaps the most comprehensive matching of the 
ideas proposed by Professor Epstein with the Supreme Court and lower federal court case law 
that has developed over the last decade, we are by no means the first to note the influence 
Professor Epstein's work is having on takings doctrine. See infra note 46 (collection of sources 
discussing Professor Epstein's influence on takings law). 
5 See infra notes 35-79 and accompanying text. 
6 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 281 ("It will be said that my position invalidates much of the 
twentieth century legislation, and so it does."). 
7 The Lochner era is named for its most famous case Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), 
in which the Supreme Court struck down a law establishing a sixty hour work week for bakery 
employees. During this period, which lasted roughly forty years from 1897 through 1937, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Contract and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution to 
invalidate labor laws and other progressive social reform initiatives of that era. This period 
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courts ruling for developers were appointed to their respective courts 
by Presidents Reagan and Bush. Finally, the cases themselves 
showed remarkable activism by the jurists: in many cases, the judges 
overcame seemingly insurmountable procedural and substantive hur-
dles to rule in favor of the developers. 
Looking a bit deeper, we noted the political, more than the judicial 
or scholarly, background of many of these same judges and found that 
the appointment of these politically savvy jurists to their posts re-
sulted, in many instances, from a concerted effort by conservatives 
and libertarians within the Reagan and Bush administrations to use 
the court system to further their attack on federal regulations. Even 
more remarkably, we discovered that the most activist judges on the 
Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims-the federal courts 
with exclusive jurisdiction over most takings cases against the federal 
government-all recently have attended the same, all-expenses-paid, 
week-long summer seminar at a Montana resort hosted by a property 
rights group. Finally, we found that the same conservative founda-
tions that funded these Montana seminars also bankroll takings liti-
gation before the Federal Circuit. 
Turning to the process by which takings cases work their way 
through the court system, what we found was equally notable. The 
Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) and a dozen other "public interest" 
legal foundations located around the country represent developers 
free-of-charge in takings cases. PLF and others recruit and train an 
army of private practitioners to assist them in shepherding cases 
through the legal system. Large and powerful lobbies such as the 
National Association of Home Builders similarly devote significant 
resources both to litigating takings cases and promoting "procedural 
reform legislation" in Congress that would grease the wheels of tak-
ings litigation. 
We refer to the sum of these parts-the deliberate appointment of 
activist conservative judges to critical positions on the federal judici-
ary; the activism of these judges in creating constitutionally protected 
development rights; and the combined efforts by developers, founda-
tions, and non-profit organizations to guide takings cases through the 
court system-as the Takings Project (borrowing Charles Fried's 
reached its zenith in the mid-1930s when the Court repeatedly struck down President 
Roosevelt's New Deal programs, and ended in 1937 when Justice Roberts switched his vote and 
became the fifth justice necessary to uphold the New Deal. See generally West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
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term), and this Article is devoted to outlining its contours and chroni-
cling its progress. The Project is not the first campaign mounted to 
influence the judiciary's interpretation of a constitutional provision,S 
but it may well be the most comprehensive and expensive. It is 
certainly among the least defensible. 
The Takings Project is indefensible, first and foremost, because 
there is no good reason for federal judges to overturn popular and 
important health, safety, and environmental laws to protect develop-
ers. The development rights the Project seeks to create simply do not 
exist within the text or original meaning of the Constitution, and 
there is no theory of judicial review which justifies creating constitu-
tional rights to protect a group-developers-that needs little assis-
tance in the political process. 
The Project is indefensible, also, because it depends upon a simul-
taneous narrowing of what is considered a "nuisance" and an expan-
sion of what is considered property. The sponsors of the Project, in 
other words, are seeking to allow the concept of property to expand 
into the twenty-first century while simultaneously freezing in time a 
concept that has been a fixture of property law for centuries-the 
principle that a property owner has no right to use his or her property 
in ways that injure his or her neighbors. 
The Project is indefensible, finally, because it is not grounded in any 
consistent or coherent theory on the proper role of the federal judici-
ary in policing the legislative process. At the same time the Takings 
Project asks for what Richard Epstein called "a level of judicial inter-
vention ... far greater than we have ever had,''9 many of the Project's 
strongest proponents are using cries of judicial activism to delay 
confirmation of President Clinton's judicial appointments.1o At the 
8 For an inspiring account of the century's most famous and, arguably most successful, 
constitutional litigation campaign see generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975) 
(discussing the NAACP's constitutional litigation campaign leading, ultimately, to the Supreme 
Court's landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954». 
9 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 30-31. 
10 Orrin Hatch, Judicial Nominees: The Senate's Steady Progress, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1998, 
at C9 ("Judicial activism from the left or from the right has plagued this nation, and we should 
reject nominees who will not apply the Constitution and statutes as written and will instead 
substitute their own personal preferences. Judges must understand their role in our constitu-
tional system as impartial magistrates, not Monday-morning legislators."); see also James E. 
Ryan & Douglas T. Kendall, Property Rights: What Does The Constitution Say? Conservatives 
Favor Private Ownership Over Environmental Protections, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 
18, 1997, at B7 (critiquing Senator Hatch's simultaneous attack on judicial activism and promo-
tion of the Takings Project). 
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same time the Takings Project seeks a dramatic expansion of the text 
and meaning of the Takings Clause, many of its proponents are rely-
ing on a narrow, textual interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
to attack all forms of affirmative action.ll The Project is indefensible, 
in other words, for its hypocrisy. The Project is hypocritical, more-
over, because the promoters portray it as a "civil rights" issue and 
themselves as champions of the small landowner when the primary 
objective of the Project is, and has always been, the advancement of 
an anti-regulatory, anti-environmental political agenda. 
The Takings Project is at an important juncture. A dozen years in, 
the Project's promoters have won important victories, but remain far 
from achieving their ultimate objective. The expansive opinions of the 
Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims are hindering the 
operation of important environmental laws including the Endangered 
Species Act and the wetland provisions of the Clean Water Act, but 
have yet to survive scrutiny by the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court, instead, has handed Project advocates important, but narrow, 
victories, containing both the foundation for a more dramatic expan-
sion of takings law, and, potentially, the seeds of the Project's defeat. 
The direction the Supreme Court will follow is at this point unknown 
and probably will depend on unknowable developments in the compo-
sition of the Court.12 
We write as part of a larger effort to bring attention to the Project 
and, thereby, to help stop it before it goes much further.13 Neither the 
means-the activities we encompass within the term the Takings 
Project-nor the ends of the Project-interpreting the Takings 
Clause to thwart popular and important health, safety, and environ-
mental laws-withstand serious scrutiny. As a result, the more atten-
tion the media, policymakers and the public pays to the Project, the 
less likely it will succeed. 
This Article proceeds in four sections. Section I begins with a brief 
discussion of the text of the Takings Clause, the original intent of the 
framers of the Clause, and the gradual evolution of the takings doc-
11 See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, The Right Can't Have It Both Ways, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 8, 1998, at M5. 
12 The Supreme Court is so closely divided on takings issues that one appointment by Presi-
dent Clinton or his successor(s) could determine the ultimate outcome of the Project. 
13 The authors are members of the Board of Directors of the Community Rights Counsel 
(CRC), a non-profit, public interest law firm founded in 1997 to help communities protect laws 
that regulate land use from the attack of the Takings Project. Mr. Kendall serves as CRC's 
Executive Director. 
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trine over nearly two centuries. After summarizing the status of 
takings law in 1985, when Professor Epstein's book was published, we 
turn to Epstein's work. In particular, we examine his argument that 
the Takings Clause itself renders zoning laws, wetlands regulations, 
flood-control legislation, and a wide variety of other laws regulating 
land use "constitutionally suspect or infirm." Drawing upon a decade 
of scholarly criticism, we thoroughly refute Epstein's claim that his 
proposed result is compelled by or even consistent with the text of 
the Constitution. We conclude, as have many before us, that whatever 
value Takings may have as a polemic in support of Epstein's reaction-
ary political views, it is, as one scholar called it, a "travesty of consti-
tutional scholarship."14 
Sections II and III summarize the Takings Project. Section II be-
gins with a brief discussion of how President Reagan's second term 
Attorney General Edwin Meese and his advisors seized upon Profes-
sor Epstein's blueprint for interpreting the Takings Clause as a vehi-
cle to implement President Reagan's attack on federal health, safety, 
and environmental regulations. Section II then turns to the most 
important legacy of the Reagan and Bush presidencies, the appoint-
ment of conservative activist judges to critical positions in the federal 
judiciary. Section III identifies the individuals and groups that are 
most responsible for directing the Takings Project and summarizes 
the intense litigation, training and lobbying campaign these individu-
als and groups are waging to move takings cases through the court 
system. 
Section IV documents the results of the Takings Project. This 
Section begins with a discussion of how the Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts have ignored innumerable procedural roadblocks in 
eagerly reaching out to hear the merits of "poster child" cases brought 
to them by conservative legal foundations. It will then discuss three 
of the most important aspects of Professor Epstein's takings doctrine 
and trace the progress of those ideas into the nation's case law. The 
Article will end with a summary of the status of the Takings Project 
in 1998 and a brief discussion of what opponents of the Project can do 
to prevent the Project from advancing further toward its objective of 
making all forms of land use regulation too expensive to enforce. 
14 Thomas c. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 24 (1986). 
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1. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE, TAKINGS DOCTRINE CIRCA 1985, AND 
PROFESSOR EpSTEIN'S THEORY 
A. Constitutional Text and Original Intent 
The Takings Clause states in its entirety: "nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation." By its terms, 
the clause's scope is quite narrow: it applies only when the govern-
ment "takes" private property and it does not prevent such takings, 
but rather requires that the government provide "just compensation" 
when takings occur. While the term "take" is not defined in the Con-
stitution, it most naturally means an expropriation of property,15 such 
as when the government exercises its eminent domain power to ac-
quire private property to build a road, a military base or a park. 
This plain language interpretation of the clause is consistent with 
both the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the opinions of 
the Supreme Court in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
While there is considerable academic disagreement over the framer's 
general views on property, there is little debate that the framers 
believed that the Takings Clause only would prohibit actual expro-
priations of private property. Even justices like Antonin Scalia, who 
have applied the clause beyond its text and original meaning, start 
from a recognition that the framers believed the clause would only 
apply to actual expropriations of property.16 Similarly, there is no 
15 Webster's Dictionary's first definition of the word "take" is ''to get into one's possession by 
force, skill, or artifice; seize, grasp, catch, capture, win, etc." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DIC-
TIONARY 1123 (1995). 
16 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992). "Justice 
Blackmun is correct that early constitutional theorists did not believe that the Takings Clause 
embraced regulations of property at all .... " Id. at 1056-58 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); EpSTEIN, 
supra note 3, at 26-29 (recognizing historical evidence that many of the framers thought the 
Takings Clause was limited in application to physical expropriations but concluding that there 
is no need "to take into account the actual historical intentions of any of the parties who drafted 
or signed the document"); see also William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the 
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782,825 (1995); John A. Humbach, 
"Taking" the Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial Revi-
sion of Legislative Judgements, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771, 776-77 (1993) (collecting sources in 
support of the notion that "interpreting the Takings Clause to limit regulation appears ahisto-
rical, contrary to both the intentions of the Framers and to the understanding of most 19th 
century judges"); William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1395 
(1993) (noting that Justice Scalia's justifications in Lucas for reading the Takings Clause broadly 
"plainly diverge from the originalist theory to which [Justice Scalia] formerly pledged his 
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dispute that until the second half of the nineteenth century, the Su-
preme Court steadfastly refused to extend the clause beyond actual 
expropriations. An 1870 opinion by the Supreme Courtl7 illustrates 
the position the Court took during this era: 
[The Takings Clause] has always been understood as referring 
only to direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries 
resulting from the exercise of lawful power .... [I]t is not every 
hardship that is unjust, much less that is unconstitutional; and 
certainly it would be an anomaly for us to hold an act of Congress 
invalid merely because we might think its provisions harsh and 
unjust. ls 
B. The Evolution of Modern (Pre-1985) Takings Law 
The notion that the Takings Clause may confine government actions 
beyond the purposeful expropriation of property emerged gradually 
over the next one hundred years as the Supreme Court ruled on cases 
in which government action very closely resembled expropriations of 
property. The first of these cases, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company/9 
involved a state authorized dam that flooded Pumpelly's property. In 
requiring compensation, the Court noted: 
[i]t would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in con-
struing a provision of constitutional law ... it shall be held that if 
the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real 
property to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, 
can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in 
effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compen-
sation, because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it has not 
taken for the public use.20 
To avoid this "curious and unsatisfactory" result, the Court ruled that, 
"where real estate is actually invaded," a taking may be held to have 
occurred.21 
allegiance"); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 230 (1990) ("My difficulty is not that Epstein's constitution would repeal much ofthe 
New Deal and the modern regulatory-welfare state but rather that these conclusions are not 
plausibly related to the original understanding of the takings clause."). 
17 Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551-52 (1870). 
18 Treanor, supra note 16, at 794-96. 
19 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872). 
20 [d. at 177-78. 
21 [d. at 181; see also Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924) (to be a taking, 
flooding must "constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropria-
tion of, and not merely an injury to, the property"); Treanor, supra note 16, at 795-96 n.74 ("[T]he 
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Nearly fifty years later, in the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal v. 
Mahon,22 the Court expanded the reach of the Takings Clause again 
to encompass particularly oppressive regulations. Pennsylvania Coal 
involved the Kohler Act, a state law that prevented coal companies 
from mining coal that formed the support for the surface area. Penn-
sylvania law recognized this "support estate" as a distinct property 
interest, and Justice Holmes found the Act "purports to abolish what 
is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable 
estate .... "23 Justice Holmes declared that the Pennsylvania law had 
"very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropri-
ating or destroying [the estate]," and, again relying on this analogy 
to an expropriation of property, declared that when regulations "go 
too far" they can be considered takings.24 
At about the same time the Court in Pumpelly first expanded the 
reach of the Takings Clause beyond actual expropriations, the Court 
also clarified that the clause was not intended to interfere with legiti-
mate attempts by legislatures to protect public health and safety. In 
doing so, the Court established a "nuisance exception" to takings 
liability. The exception originated in Mugler v. Kansas, a case involv-
ing a state law that prohibited the operation of breweries. The Court 
ruled in Mugler that "all property in this country is held under the 
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to 
the community"25 and that the Takings Clause does not require com-
pensation for losses a property owner may sustain ''by reason of their 
not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict 
injury upon the community."26 
Following Mugler, the Supreme Court applied the nuisance excep-
tion to justify a significant number of legislative prohibitions without 
compensation.27 The Court recognized that declaring an activity a 
government action in Pumpelly gave rise to a compensation requirement because it was a de 
facto physical taking. Initially the Court construed Pumpelly as limited to this very narrow 
category of cases."). 
22 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) 
23 Id. at 414. 
24Id. at 414-15. 
25 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,665 (1887). 
26Id. at 669. 
27 See generally Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibition on operation 
of a gravel pit); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (infected cedar trees); Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition on brickyards); Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 
(1912) (pool halls); Powell v. Pennsylvania 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (ban on sale of oleomargarine); 
see also Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1906) (no compensation 
required when railroad forced to tear down and rebuild an unsafe bridge). 
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nuisance falls within the province of the legislature, and that the 
legislature is not limited to outlawing only those activities that have 
been considered by courts to be common law nuisances.28 The Court 
also acknowledged that what is and is not a nuisance would change 
over time, and that the legislature could declare uses that were for-
merly commonplace to be contemporary nuisances.29 
Justice Brennan summarized the status of takings law prior to 1985 
in his opinion for the Court in Penn Central Transportation v. New 
York City.30 As Justice Brennan noted, the question of what consti-
tutes a regulatory takings (i.e. when a regulation was sufficiently akin 
to an expropriation) for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment "has 
proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty" and the Court "quite 
simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining 
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by 
public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain 
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."3! Instead, the 
Court relied upon a balancing of three factors: (1) the economic impact 
of the regulation, (2) the extent the regulation interferes with "dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations," and (3) the character of the 
government action.32 Under Penn Central's balancing test, no one 
factor alone is determinative,33 and significant diminutions in property 
value are generally permissible without compensation.34 
While not always simple to apply, the doctrine the Court estab-
lished in Pumpelly, Mugler, Pennsylvania Coal, Penn Central, and 
other cases had a logic based on the text and the original meaning of 
the clause. The clause was applied primarily to prevent uncompen-
28 See Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 593; Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 411; Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 
237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915) (declaring it "beside the question" whether a livery stable was a common 
law nuisance and noting that the legislature could "declare that in partiCUlar circumstances ... 
a livery stable shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law ... "). 
29 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926). 
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing condi-
tions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even 
a half century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive ... 
while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their appli-
cation must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are 
constantly coming within the field of their operation. 
Id. at 387 
30 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
31 Id. at 123-24. 
32 Id. at 124. 
33Id. at 130-31 & n.27. 
34 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384 (permitting approximately 75% diminution in value); Hadacheck 
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sated expropriations of property. Where the clause was extended 
beyond expropriations, the Court was careful to limit the clause's 
application to regulations that reasonably could be characterized as 
being akin to expropriations. 
C. Professor Epstein's Anti-Regulatory Blueprint 
Enter Professor Epstein. In a theory first articulated in the late 
1970s and, with a grant from a conservative foundation, printed in 
book form in 1985,35 Professor Epstein posited that the Takings 
Clause could be used as a tool to implement the Reagan administra-
tion's crusade against federal regulations. Put another way, Epstein 
theorized that the Takings Clause renders unconstitutional any and 
all redistributions of wealth, and thus renders "constitutionally infirm 
or suspect many of the heralded reforms and institutions of the twen-
tieth century: zoning, rent control, workers' compensation laws, 
transfer payments, [and] progressive taxation."36 
Professor Epstein's thesis is simple enough to describe. He con-
tends that there is a natural right to property ownership, and that, 
based on the philosophy of John Locke, the government has only a 
very limited right to interfere with such ownership.37 Property own-
ership, in turn, consists a bundle of rights, of which possession, use, 
and disposition are the most important.3s Any governmental interfer-
ence with any of these rights, Epstein asserts, is a taking that must 
be compensated-"no matter how small the alteration and no matter 
how general its application."39 
To reach his result, Epstein suggested that the Supreme Court 
should revise then-standing precedent in two critical ways. First, and 
most importantly, Epstein argued that the Court should dramatically 
increase the number of regulatory actions that are subject to judicial 
review. Under Penn Central, the Court reviewed a very narrow 
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (permitting 92.5% diminution in value from $800,000 to 
$60,000); see also Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust 
for So. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (rejecting a takings claim based on allegations that an 
employer's "withdrawal liability" from a mUlti-employer pension plan required payments of 
"46% of shareholder equity," on the grounds that "our cases have long established that mere 
diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking"). 
36 EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at xi (recognizing "a generous grant from the Institute for Educa-
tional Affairs"). 
36 [d. at x. 
37 See id. at 7-18. 
38 See id. at 57...u2. 
391d. 
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category of cases under the Takings Clause-typically only those 
regulations that had a significant impact on the value of the "parcel 
as a whole."40 Epstein argued as follows: (1) that property ownership 
can be divided into "incidents" or "sticks in the bundle" (such as the 
right to use the property, the right to exclude others, and the right 
to sell or grant property to one's heirs), and that the Takings Clause 
"extends to each stick in the bundle as well as to the bundle itself,"41 
and (2) that the Takings Clause protects against partial as well as total 
takings. In other words, according to Epstein, if the government 
interferes in any way with any of the sticks-in-the-bundle, the prop-
erty owner has a potential takings claim.42 
Second, Epstein advocated a reconstruction of the nuisance excep-
tion to Takings Clause liability. As described above, the nuisance 
exception crafted by the Supreme Court in Mugler and subsequent 
cases was an evolving doctrine, defined by the legislature but chang-
ing with new notions of what constitutes an injurious use. Epstein 
advocated that the Court adopt a narrower, static definition of the 
nuisance exception that would, in essence, freeze the notion of what 
is a nuisance to the narrow category of injurious uses (generally 
involving physical invasions of neighboring properties) that histori-
cally have been recognized as a nuisance by common law courts.43 
D. Epstein Critiqued 
Although criticized (if not ridiculed) within the legal academy as 
"shallow,"44 a "travesty of constitutional scholarship,"45 and a failure 
as a matter of history, logic, philosophy, or textual analysis,46 Takings 
40 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130---32 (1978); infra notes 30---34 
and accompanying text (discussing Penn Central). 
41 EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 58. 
42 See id. at 57, 62. 
There is no hierarchy among incidents, no degrees of ownership. There is a partial 
taking of property if possession is removed, and use and disposition remain; if use is 
removed, and possession and disposition remain; or if disposition is removed, and use 
and possession remain. Nor is there a requirement that the loss of the incident be total; 
partial losses of single incidents may determine the measure of damages, but may not 
negate the taking. Any deprivation of rights is a taking, regardless of how it is effected 
or the damages it causes. 
[d. at 62. 
43 See id. at 107-25. 
44 Thomas Ross, Review, Taking Takings Seriously, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1591, 1592 (1987). 
45 Grey, supra note 14, at 24. Earlier in Grey's article he notes that, in many respects, Takings 
"belongs with the output of the constitutional lunatic fringe." [d. at 23. 
46 See Joseph L. Sax, Review, Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 279 (1986). For additional 
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has been used as a legitimizing tool by those interested in using the 
Takings Clause to halt government regulation.47 More importantly, as 
described in detail in Section IV, many of the changes to takings 
doctrine that Epstein proposed now have found their way into federal 
case law, and the judges and justices making these critical alterations 
to constitutional law have relied extensively upon Takings.48 It is 
therefore important to articulate clearly and early in this Article some 
of the legion of severe flaws in Professor Epstein's work.49 These flaws 
render Epstein's work thoroughly unable to bear the intellectual 
weight that conservative and libertarian judges, activists and policy 
makers have tried to rest upon it. 
The principal reason Takings is both dangerous and disingenuous 
is that it purports to be a book about what the text of the Constitution 
says, but it is actually an extended description of what Professor 
Epstein wishes the Constitution said.5O Most remarkable is Epstein's 
claim that his end result-the requirement of compensation for virtu-
ally any regulation that diminishes the value of property-is com-
manded by the text of the Constitution.51 How Epstein reaches this 
evidence of the disdain with which scholars received 1hkings, see Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-u, at 606 n.6 (2d ed. 1988) (''the gaps, flawed assumptions and 
argumentative [el]isions in Epstein's reactionary interpretation of the Fifth Amendment [are] 
too numerous to address fairly here ... "); see also Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern 
American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 556-U7 (1995). 
47 See Ross, supra note 44, at 1592, 1603; Treanor, supra note 16, at 815 ("[a]lmost certainly, 
in recent years Professor Richard Epstein has influenced political discourse about the Takings 
Clause more than any other academic"); Ed Carson, Property Frights (property rights), REA-
SON, May 1, 1996, at 29; ("Richard Epstein provided the intellectual framework for the property 
rights movement .... Public interest law firms, such as the Institute for Justice, Pacific Legal 
Foundation, and the Northwest Legal Foundation, used Epstein's work to launch a property 
rights renaissance in the courts."). 
48 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian Property, 
Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25 ENVTL. L. 171, 193 
(1995) ("[ w ]hat is even more remarkable about Florida Rock is that its "partial takings "doctrine 
seems to have come directly from Professor Epstein's book"). 
49 See generally Grey, supra note 14, at 21-48. As Professor Mark Kelman acknowledged, one 
might question the value of attacking a book that is so clearly terrible; it is important to do so, 
however, because "in today's political intellectual culture, 1hkings is taken seriously." Mark 
Kelman, Review, 1hking 1hkings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1829, 
1829-30 (1986). 
50 See BORK, supra note 16, at 230 ("Epstein has written a powerful work of political theory, 
one eminently worth reading in those terms, but has not convincingly located that political 
theory in the Constitution."). As Professor Sax observed in his review, "the book purports to 
be constitutional theory, but it makes no effort to come to terms with more than a century of 
constitutional law development." Sax, supra note 46, at 280. 
51 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 31. 
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point is difficult to follow, as his theory of interpretation is both 
elusive and internally inconsistent. He begins his book by contending 
that property is a natural right and that Locke's philosophy of limited 
government animates the Constitution.52 Both claims are controver-
sial, and Epstein offers no evidence that the framers believed prop-
erty was a natural right (nor does he explain how such a belief is 
reflected in the Constitution), nor does he confront the vast body of 
scholarly literature that demonstrates that Locke was only one of 
several philosophers influential at the time the Constitution was 
framed.53 What is truly amazing, however, is that after extolling the 
influence of Locke, Epstein seeks to "correct" a portion of Locke's 
philosophy that is inconsistent with Epstein's theory. 
Specifically, Locke believed that property originally was owned in 
common as a gift from God.54 Individuals, according to Locke, could 
acquire private property by investing their labor in the property, and 
as a result, one could assert private property rights in the product of 
the individual's own labor.55 These private rights, however, could only 
be exercised "'where there is enough, and as good left in common for 
others."'56 Locke's theory of property, which Epstein contends in-
fluenced the Constitution, thus provided for the right of each person 
to an equal share of property and precluded private acquisitions of 
property that would deprive others of this right.57 Instead of confront-
ing this aspect of Locke, and explaining how it can possibly fit with 
Epstein's theory that individuals should be completely free to ac-
quire as much property as possible, Epstein brushes it aside by "cor-
rect[ing]" Locke's philosophy to allow for the unfettered acquisition 
52 See id. at 7-18. 
53 See Treanor, supra note 16, at 823-24 ("While historians are sharply divided on a host of 
interpretive matters concerning republicanism and liberalism in the revolutionary era and the 
first years of the early republic, there is now a near consensus that both republican and liberal 
ideas powerfully influenced American politics during the 1780s and 1790s."); see generally 
GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); BERNARD 
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 35-36 (1967); Gregory 
S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
273 (1991). 
54 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 10-11 (citing JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ~ 27 
(1690». 
55 See id. 
56 [d. (quoting LOCKE, supra note 54, ~ 27). 
57 For a modern explication of this theory, see Akil Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A 
Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 37, 37 (1990) (arguing 
that the state may have an obligation to provide a minimum amount of property to all its 
citizens). 
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of private property.58 This correction, although done almost casually 
by Epstein, is a radical restatement of Locke's philosophy.59 As one 
commentator noted, it is "akin to a Christian claiming that Judaism is 
consistent with his religion, with a small correction of Judaism texts 
to embrace Jesus Christ as the Son of God."60 
Epstein's superficial and manipulative treatment of Locke, which 
occurs early on in Takings, gives a good preview of things to come. 
After explaining the philosophical foundations of his theory, Epstein 
then addresses constitutional interpretation directly. Contrary to 
generations of scholars who have struggled to make sense of the 
Takings Clause, Epstein suggests that the answer is easy: simply 
follow the ordinary language of the text.61 Epstein thus blithely con-
tends, in a mere 12 pages of his 350 page book, that the language of 
the Takings Clause alone, which requires that "private property shall 
not be taken for public use without just compensation," renders sus-
pect any interference with any strand in a property owner's bundle 
of rights-Le., almost all social welfare and land use regulation of the 
last sixty years.62 He recognizes that the key terms in the clause-
private property, taken, public use, and just compensation-are not 
defined in the Constitution, but suggests that the terms can be con-
cretely defined by looking to "the way these words [were] used in 
ordinary discourse by persons who are educated in the normal social 
and cultural discourse of their own time."63 
One has the immediate impression when reading this section of 
Epstein's book that it cannot be that simple, and one wonders why-if 
the answers are all in the plain language of the constitutional text-
Epstein felt the need to begin his book with a discussion of natural 
rights and Locke's philosophy. The answers become clear in the ensu-
ing chapters, as Epstein fails to adhere to the "plain language" ap-
58 EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 10-11 (quoting LOCKE, supra note 54, , 27). As Epstein writes 
in a later article, "the takings clause should be read as being inspired by Locke's treatise but 
not as following its language, or its logic, to the end." Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and 
Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 1,2 n.5. 
69 See Ross, supra note 44, at 1594. 
60 [d.; see also Charles Fried, Protecting Property-Law and Politics, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 44, 48-49 (1990). Fried, Solicitor General during Ronald Reagan's presidency, wrote with 
regard to Epstein's "correction" of Locke that "Locke himself ... was insufficiently Lockean" 
for Epstein, and thus "Professor Epstein is moved to complete not only the text of the Consti-
tution by reference to the Lockean spirit, but Locke's text itself." Fried, supra, at 48-49. 
61 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 31. 
62 See id. at 29-31. 
63 See id. at 20. 
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proach he advocates and continually falls back on philosophical and 
natural rights arguments to support his theory. As Joseph Sax ob-
served, Epstein's inexplicable shifts gives one the sense that Epstein 
is playing a game "whose rules only he knows."64 Not surprisingly, 
Epstein's interpretive shell game "produces a Constitution that com-
ports perfectly with his personal political philosophy."65 
An example illustrates how Epstein accomplishes his task. Perhaps 
the most important question in takings law today is whether property 
owners should be compensated when a land use regulation diminishes 
the value of a piece of property, but does not take away all value.66 
True to his conservative values, if not to constitutional principle, 
Epstein argues that property owners of course must be compen-
sated under such circumstances. According to Epstein, a "taking" has 
occurred whenever the government "diminish[es] the rights of the 
owner in any fashion ... no matter how small the alteration."67 
There is one problem with this contention: the word "take" does not 
mean "diminish" today, and there is no evidence that it ever did. The 
same is true with the word "alter" -it simply does not mean "take" 
and never did. There is thus no way to justify Epstein's conclusion as 
flowing from the text of the Takings Clause. On the contrary, it turns 
out that with regard to perhaps the most crucial and controversial 
issue in takings law, whether property owners should be compensated 
whenever regulations diminish but do not eviscerate property values, 
Epstein's own anointed theory of constitutional interpretation-fol-
lowing the plain language of the text-leads to precisely the opposite 
result of that which he advocates. True to form, Epstein does not 
confront this obvious inconsistency, but ducks it; he never offers a 
definition of the term "take," nor does he argue that his expansive 
notion of the reach of the Takings Clause is consistent with the ordi-
nary meaning of the term "take." Instead, he falls back on his philo-
sophical argument that the framers, in reliance on Locke (corrected, 
of course, to suit Epstein's theory), granted the government very 
limited power to interfere with private property. As Professor Alex-
ander observed, while Epstein's contention "is an argument for a 
64 Sax, supra note 46, at 280. 
65 Id. at 282. 
66 See generally Blumm, supra note 48, at 194 ("partial takings" doctrine "threatens to 
undermine all environmental and land use regulation"). 
67 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 57. 
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broad construction of takings, it is surely not the argument of a 
textualliteralist."68 
The inconsistencies in Epstein's theory can be illustrated by an-
other example. Epstein argues on the one hand that we should inter-
pret the words of the Takings Clause according to the way those 
words were used by educated persons at the time of the framing of 
the Constitution. But then he suggests, on the other hand, that we 
should simply ignore what those same educated persons actually did 
in terms of regulating land, labor, or wages. It is therefore not impor-
tant to Epstein that the framing generation allowed extensive land 
use regulations and wage and price controls; Epstein is not at all 
concerned that his interpretation is inconsistent with evidence re-
garding the framer's original intent.69 Why, though, should we ignore 
what these educated persons did when trying to discern how these 
same educated persons would have interpreted the words in the 
Constitution? After all, even Epstein acknowledges that historical 
sources "are exceedingly helpful in allowing us to understand the 
standard meanings of ordinary language as embodied in constitutional 
text."70 Historical sources, in turn, indicate quite clearly that the 
standard meaning of the phrase "take private property" did not en-
compass land use regulations.71 
In short, Epstein's conclusions about the scope of the Takings 
Clause are at odds with the "plain language" method of constitutional 
interpretation which he advocates. His conclusions rest instead on 
vague, adulterated philosophical foundations that he fails to connect 
to the Constitution itself. The blatant and repeated inconsistency 
between his "plain language" approach and· the radical results he 
reads into the Constitution, together with his occasional reliance on 
68 Larry Alexander, Takings of Propmy and Constitutional Serendipity, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
223, 225 (1986). 
69 See supra note 16 (collecting authorities). 
70 EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 29. 
71 John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 
109 HARv. L. REV. 1252, 1258 (1996). 
Today's doctrine of regulatory takings only makes sense as a reading of the Takings 
Clause if, as the Court has said, land use regulation was confined to injurious uses when 
the Fifth Amendment was adopted, with regulation of non-injurious uses coming much 
later. (citation omitted). The history presented in the Article shows, to the contrary, 
that regulation of non-injurious uses of land was very common at the time of the 
nation's founding. This prevalance implies that the Framers did not address regulation 
in the Takings Clause because they did not regard regulation as a form of taking. 
Id. at 1258 (citation omitted). 
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natural rights and his corrected version of Locke's philosophy, largely 
explain why Takings was received with such disdain by constitutional 
scholars. The book simply does not offer a principled means of inter-
preting the Takings Clause. Rather it offers an abundance of smoke 
and mirrors that advocates and judges sympathetic with Epstein's 
distaste of government regulation can use to provide some semblance 
of authority to their arguments about what the Takings Clause means. 
And this appears to be precisely what Epstein intended. In his book 
and in the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal in an article entitled 
"Needed: Activist Judges for Economic Rights,"72 Epstein suggested 
that his theory would require "a level of judicial intervention far 
greater than we now have, and indeed far greater than we ever have 
had."73 
Epstein's call for judicial activism has been answered in part by the 
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, both of which, as described 
later in this Article, have expanded the scope of the Takings Clause 
in recent years, often along lines suggested in Epstein's book.74 Ep-
stein's call has also inspired the constitutional litigation strategy of 
the current property rights movement, which increasingly has turned 
its attention to the federal judiciary as the means by which it will 
accomplish its agenda.75 Judicial activism, of course, is often decried 
by the same conservatives-Orrin Hatch, to cite one prominent ex-
ample-on the grounds that unelected federal judges should not, 
without clear support in the Constitution, interfere with democratic 
law-making.76 This criticism, however, applies with perfect and ironic 
72 Grey, supra note 14, at 22 n.2 (quoting the article). 
73 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 30. 
74 See, e.g., MARK POLLOT, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
AMERICA 161 (1993) ("If lasting change is to come in property rights protection, it will come 
from court actions that resolve questions that are presently unresolved. Legislation is too open 
to change whereas judicial rulings of constitutional dimension cannot be changed by the legis-
lature."); see also James L. Huffman, Judge Plager's "Sea Change" in Regulatory Takings Law, 
6 FORD. ENVTL. L.J. 597,600-10 (1995) [hereinafter Huffman IJ (praising Judge Plager's opinion 
in Florida Rock, but suggesting that it could have been improved by an even closer adherence 
to the doctrine outlined by Professor Epstein); James L. Huffman, A Coherent Takings Theory 
at Last: Comments on Richard Epstein's Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 
17 ENVTL. L. 153 (1986) [hereinafter Huffman II). 
75 See, e.g., Fried, supra note 60, at 48 ("The text and inspiration for some of the boldest of 
the recent litigation efforts has been Richard Epstein's celebrated book, Takings."); Deborah 
Graham, Conservative Academics: Rising Stars, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18, 1985, at 1 ("Epstein 
has gained a certain amount of disfavor amoung some conservatives because they think he 
favors judicial activism."). 
76 See Hatch, supra note 10, at e9. 
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force to the expansion of the Takings Clause, as such an expansion is 
without clear support in the Constitution (or in the historical evidence 
regarding original intent), and, indeed, prominent conservative legal 
scholars-such as Robert Bork and Charles Fried-have strongly 
criticized the Takings Project on just this basis.77 
Nor can this particular brand of judicial activism be justified on the 
ground that federal courts would simply be correcting defects in 
the legislative process. Constitutional scholars have defended judi-
cial pro-tection of "discrete and insular minorities" against claims of 
judicial overreaching by arguing that it is appropriate, and indeed 
enhances the democratic operation of government, for federal courts 
to protect those who are shut out from the normal political process 
because of systemic prejudice or a denial of access to power.78 Judicial 
intervention, in other words, might be appropriate to correct a legis-
lative process that does not pay sufficient attention to the needs and 
concerns of "discrete and insular" minorities. With regard to most 
property owners, and certainly with regard to large developers, it is 
quite difficult to justify federal court intervention on the ground that 
such groups or individuals have limited access or are routinely short-
changed by the political process.79 
In the end, then, Richard Epstein and the promoters of the Takings 
Project are calling for federal judges to interfere substantially with a 
plethora of democratically-enacted and democratically-supported leg-
islative measures, even though such a result is not commanded by the 
language of the Constitution, not explained by reference to the fra-
mers' intentions, and not justified by any coherent constitutional the-
ory. This call for heightened judicial protection, moreover, is made on 
behalf of a group that generally does quite well in the legislative 
77 BORK, supra note 16, at 223, 230-S1 ("[t]hough I am more in sympathy with [Epstein's] 
political ends than I am with the objectives of the ultraliberals, I do not think they establish 
satisfactorily that those ends may be reached through the Court"); see Fried, supra note 60, at 
48-51. In a typically superficial passage in his book, consisting of one and one-half pages, Epstein 
asserts that his theory does not "depend upon a belief in judicial activism in cases of economic 
liberties," because the consequences of his theory "are necessary implications derived from the 
constitutional text and the underlying theory of the state that it embodies." EpSTEIN, supra 
note 3, at 30-S1. As explained above, Epstein's theory most certainly is not a necessary 
implication of the constitutional text. What "theory of the state" the text embodies, in turn, is 
a matter of serious scholarly debate, utterly ignored by Epstein, who inexplicably argues just 
pages before this assertion that constitutional terms should not be interpreted with reference 
to their purposes or the values served by them. 
78 The most famous explication of this political process theory of judicial review is John Hart 
Ely's Democracy and Distrust (1982). 
79 See Treanor, supra note 16, at 879; Kendall, supra note 2, at 558-62. 
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process. It is difficult to imagine a less compelling agenda for the 
federal judiciary. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE TAKINGS PROJECT 
A. Meese Justice and the "Radical Project" to Thwart 
Environmental Laws 
Extreme theories on constitutional law are routinely expounded by 
law professors and, just as routinely, remain where they are formed: 
in the relative obscurity of academic law journals. In normal times, 
Epstein's theory would have met the same demise. These were not 
normal times. Epstein's book was published in 1985, shortly after the 
reelection of Ronald Reagan to a second term in office: a heady time 
for conservatives and libertarians, particularly conservatives and lib-
ertarians interested in the development of constitutional law. 
By 1985, a dramatic shift in the ideological make up of the federal 
judiciary was already well underway. In the Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan (in his first term) had 
named six of the nine then-sitting justices and the most liberal re-
maining justices (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall) were 
aging, each approaching their 80's. With President Reagan reelected 
and Republicans in control of the Senate, the writing was on the wall: 
conservatives would be able to complete a fundamental shift in the 
composition and ideology of the federal judiciary. 
The year 1985, represented therefore, a time of opportunity for 
conservative legal scholars and political operatives. It was a time not 
only to envision the end of a period of liberal judicial activism, but also 
a time to construct the blueprint for a new era of using the court 
system to further the conservative agenda. In the minds of many 
conservatives and libertarians that congregated in Washington at the 
beginning of President Reagan's second term in office, Professor Ep-
stein's theory became that blueprint. Epstein became the "most re-
quested speaker" at Federalist Society meetings throughout the 
country,80 the choice of the Heritage Foundation to be a Supreme 
Court justice, and among the most influential intellectual leaders of 
the Reagan Revolution.81 As one administration official commented in 
80 Grey, supra note 14, at 23. 
8! Graham, supra note 75, at 1 ("Epstein, 42, is among those academicians mentioned most 
frequently as having the potential to be a major influence in Reagan's second term, influence 
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early 1985: "Epstein's ideas have begun to gain currency; ... a move-
ment is forming around . . . a lot of the thoughts he's been in the 
forefront in promoting."82 At the center of this movement within the 
Reagan administration was second term Attorney General Edwin 
Meese III. 
To Meese, one of Reagan's closest and most trusted advisers,83 the 
Reagan Revolution meant "[t]aking the Constitution, taking princi-
ples of free markets, taking the ideals of individual liberty, and trans-
lating them into action."84 At a conference on economic liberties that 
he convened at the Justice Department in 1986, he called on conser-
vatives throughout the country to "join us in what we would describe 
as a little constitutional calisthenics."85 Within the Takings Clause, he 
argued, "a revolution in, or perhaps more accurately, a revisiting and 
restoration of economic liberty is a prospect."86 
As Charles Fried, the Solicitor General at the Justice Department 
during Meese's tenure wrote in a now famous passage: 
Attorney General Meese and his young advisors-many drawn 
from the ranks ofthe then-fledgling Federalist Societies and often 
devotees of the extreme libertarian views of Chicago law profes-
sor Richard Epstein-had a specific, aggressive, and it seemed to 
me, quite radical project in mind: to use the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment as a severe brake upon federal and state regu-
lation of business and property. 
As Fried makes clear, the Takings Project had little to do with 
protecting individual landowners; the objective from the start was to 
further the Reagan Administration's attack on health and safety regu-
lations. In Fried's words: 
The grand plan was to make government pay compensation for 
taking of property every time its regulation impinged too se-
that might land him a judicial appointment. In fact, Epstein-along with Bork and Scalia-was 
mentioned as a possible Supreme Court appointee in a recent poll of leading conservatives."). 
82 [d. 
83 See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS, THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO RE-
WRITE THE CONSTITUTION 31 (1988) (Meese was "among the most powerful members of the 
Administration, and even before he became attorney general, while on the White House Staff, 
he took a very active role in Justice Department business, especially judicial appointments and 
Supreme Court arguments .... "). 
84 See Major Policy Statements of the Attorney General, Edwin Meese III, 1985-1988, at 183 
(address to the Conservative Political Action Committee Conference, Feb. 19, 1987). 
85 See id. at 142 (address to the First Annual Department of Justice Conference on the 
Constitution, Economic Liberties, and the Extended Commercial Republic, June 14, 1986). 
86 [d. at 141. 
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verely on a property right-limiting the possible uses for a parcel 
of land or restricting or tying up a business in regulatory red tape. 
If the government labored under so severe an obligation, there 
would be, to say the least, much less regulation.87 
Meese and his advisors laid the groundwork for the current Takings 
Project through a number of important measures. They convened 
conferences on "economic liberties" to discuss the strategies for rein-
vigorating the Takings Clause.88 They argued for property owners and 
against the government position in Supreme Court cases including 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.89 And they issued the 
takings Executive Order (E.O. 12,630), which required that "govern-
ment decision-makers evaluate carefully the effect of their adminis-
trative, regulatory, and legislative actions on constitutionally pro-
tected property rights."90 
B. Reshaping the Federal Judiciary 
The most important legacy of Meese's radical project, however, 
stems from the effort, started in earnest during Meese's term as 
attorney general and continued during the Bush presidency, to ap-
point conservative activist judges to spots on the three federal 
courts-the U.S. Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and the Court of Federal Claims-that control the direction of 
federal takings law. To read Professor Epstein's theory on the Takings 
Clause into the U.S. Constitution, the promoters of the Takings Pro-
ject needed judges on these courts that were willing to join in Meese's 
"constitutional calisthenics"-Le., conservative judges that, like Ep-
stein, did "not believe in judicial restraint."91 
87 FRIED, supra note 1, at 183. Meese himself does not dispute the existence of the grand plan. 
Confronted with Fried's account of his "quite radical project" Meese bristled and commented 
defensively: "maybe it is a radical departure from the regulatory mess we are in right now, but 
it's not a radical departure from the constitution." Tom Castleton, Claims Court Crusader: Chief 
Judge Puts Property Rights Up Front, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 17, 1992, at 1. 
88 See Major Policy Statements of the Attorney General, supra note 84, at 142. 
89 See Brief for the United States as AInicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 22-23, Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 86-133). 
90 See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988). 
President Reagan promoted his Executive Order as necessary to ensure federal agency com-
pliance with Nollan and First English, but, as many commentators have noted, the Order goes 
far beyond the mandates of those cases. See Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light of Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing, 12 
VA. ENVT'L L.J. 439, 442-47 (1993) (collecting authorities). Ultimately, Executive Order 12,630 
was used as the framework for the property rights legislation that came close to becoming law 
during the l04th Congress. See id. 
91 Graham, supra note 75, at 1 (quoting Epstein); see also Richard A. Epstein, Judicial 
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The Reagan and Bush administrations accomplished this transfor-
mation in the federal judiciary largely by delegating the responsibility 
for screening and choosing judges to members of the Federalist So-
ciety.92 As the New York Times reported: "President Ronald Reagan 
and President George Bush essentially turned over the privilege of 
selecting judges to lawyers in the conservative wing of the Republi-
can party, who embarked on a crusade to remake the federal courts 
"93 
During Reagan's second term in office, Assistant Attorney General 
Stephen Markman, who chaired the Washington Chapter of the Fed-
Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 4 CATO J. 711, 717-18 (1985) ("One only has to read 
the opinions of the Supreme Court on economic liberties to realize that these opinions are 
intellectually incoherent and that some movement in the direction of judicial activism is clearly 
indicated."); see generally PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, ASSAULT ON LIBERTY 1 (1992) 
(''While both Presidents [Reagan and Bush] maintained their intent was to find and appoint 
judges who would enforce the law, not make the law, they have in fact sought out judges who 
would rewrite the law and reshape it along sharp ideological lines. In the process, judges 
appointed under the guise of judicial restraint have in fact engaged in a striking measure of 
judicial activism."). 
92 The Federalist Society was formed in 1982 by four law students-David McIntosh, Lee 
Liberman, Steve Calabresi, and Spencer Abraham-at three top law schools, Harvard, Yale, 
and the University of Chicago, with the immodest mission to "reorder priorities within the legal 
system to place a premium on individual liberty, traditional values, and the rule of law." 
Federalist Society 1997-1998 Pamphlet on Student Division Membership and Benefits. Like 
Epstein, the Society's principal target is federal regulation adopted during and since the New 
Deal. Indeed, the Society's disdain for President Roosevelt's New Deal is such that Society 
members routinely hiss whenever President Roosevelt's name is mentioned. See Neil A. Lewis, 
Conservative Outsiders Now at the Hub of Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991, at B16; see also 
Peter Swire & Simon Lazarus, Reactionary Activism: Conservatives and the Constitution, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1988, at 17 (discussing an October 1987 Federalist Society conference on 
"Constitutional Protections of Economic Activity" where Professor Epstein served as the 
keynote speaker and argued that the Takings Clause "invalidates much of the 20th Century 
legislation" including "modern zoning, landmark preservation, and rent control statutes .... "). 
The Federalist Society was supported by conservative foundations as part of a much larger 
effort to develop a network of faculty, students, and alumni at universities around the country 
to oppose and reverse progressive curricula and political thought at the nation's campuses. See 
JEAN STEFANIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY, How CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND 
FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA 109 (1996). The Institute for Education 
Affairs (lEA) and the Olin Foundation (Olin) funded the Federalist Society's first symposium 
at Yale Law School. During the same few years, lEA and Olin also helped establish conservative 
newspapers, such as the Dartmouth Review, at universities across the country, and lEA bank-
rolled Professor Epstein in publishing Takings. See STEFANIC & DELGADO, supra, at 110. 
Less than four years after its inception, the Federalist Society had chapters across the 
country, thousands of members, and a $400,000 annual budget. By the end of President Reagan's 
second term, Steve Calabresi, one of the Society's founders, was able to claim that "more than 
half of the 153 Reagan-appointed Justice Department employees and all twelve assistant attor-
neys general are members or have spoken at Federalist Society events." Lewis, supra, at B16. 
93 Neil A. Lewis, A Republican Senator Forces the Administration to Rethink Strategy on 
Judicial Appointments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1994, at B7. See also Roger J. Miner, Remark, 
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eralist Society, oversaw Meese's judicial appointment process, with 
assistance from Society co-founders Liberman and Calabresi.94 Under 
Meese's guidance,Markman and his assistants applied what one com-
mentator termed " ... the most systematic ideological or judicial 
philosophical screening of judicial candidates since the first Roosevelt 
administration .... "95 Similarly, President Bush delegated primary 
control over judicial selection primarily to the White House Counsel's 
office, which, in the words of the Wall Street Journal was "an all-star 
team of the Federalists Society."96 C. Boyden Gray, the White House 
Counsel and a Federalist Society member,97 delegated primary re-
sponsibility for selecting judges to Society co-founder, Lee Liber-
man,98 who evaluated the "ideological purity" of all of Bush's candi-
dates for federal judgeships.99 
Advice & Consent in the Theory and Practice, 41 AM. u. L. REV. 1075, 1080-81 (1992). Roger 
Miner, a judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, describes the remarkable rise of the 
Federalist Society from obscurity to prominence as follows: 
The force of history and attachment to the coattails of political winners have catapulted 
[Federalist Society members] to positions of power, first as law clerks, then as movers 
and shakers in the office ofthe Attorney General and now in the office of the President. 
This has been accomplished not by acquiring political power, but by co-opting it. 
Id. at 108l. 
94 See Crocker Coulson, Federalist Pipers, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 1, 1986, at 23. 
95 Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at Midway, 
70 JUDICATURE 324, 326 (1987); see also, DAVID G. SAVAGE, TuRNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF 
THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 422-23 (1993). 
On Capitol Hill, the Senate Judiciary Committee hardly paused long enough to give 
them any label. Particularly under committee chair Strom Thurmond, Reagan's judicial 
nominees won assembly line approval. After a brief hearing, the judicial nominees 
gained confirmation to a lifetime seat on the federal judiciary .... During Reagan's 
eight years in office, he filled 378 judgeships in the three-tiered federal court system. 
Only three of his nominees were rejected by the Senate .... 
SA V AGE, supra, at 422-23. , 
96 Paul A. Gigot, Supreme Court: An Emerging Case of Poetic Justice, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 
1989 (page unavail.) (available in 1989 WL-WSJ 493281). 
97 See AI Kamen & Ruth Marcus, A Chance to Deepen Stamp on Courts, WASH. POST, Jan. 
29, 1989, at Al. Grey is now on the Society's Board of Trustees. See FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR 
LAW AND PUBLIC POJ,ICY STUDIES, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT (1997). 
98 See Miner, supra note 93, at 1081-82 ("Murray Dickman was the Attorney General's point 
man on judicial nominations. Obviously he deferred to Ms. Liberman. The present Attorney 
General [Thornburgh] seems to be little more than a conservative adjunct of the White House 
Counsel's office."). 
99 See Miner, supra note 93, at 1080-81 ("Lee Liberman ... examines all candidates for 
ideological purity. It is well known that no federal judicial appointment is made without her 
imprimatur."); see also Amy Singer, A Federalist in the White House, AM. LAW., Oct. 1991, at 
87. 
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1. The Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims 
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and the Court of Federal 
Claims were both created in 1982 and vested with the exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear takings claims against the federal government 
seeking over $10,000 in money damagesYJO The Takings Project's most 
important victories stem from the Reagan and Bush administrations' 
careful shaping of the ideological composition of these two critical 
courts. 
a. The Federal Courts Improvement Act 
Early in his first term, while Republicans controlled the Senate, 
President Reagan ushered through Congress the Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982 (FCIA).101 The Act replaced the former Court 
of Claims and Court of Custom and Patent Appeals with a new U.S. 
Claims Court (now known as the Court of Federal Claims) and estab-
lished the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals to hear appeals from the 
Claims Court.102 
While promoted as a procedural reform to improve the handling of 
claims against the United States, the FCIA gave the Reagan and 
Bush administrations a remarkable opportunity to shape these two 
critical courts. While the active commissioners on the former Claims 
Court automatically became judges on the new court, the statute 
provided that their terms would all expire, at the latest, on October 
1, 1986.103 Thus, by the middle of his second term, President Reagan 
was able to appoint every judge on the Court of Federal Claims, 
including the Chief Judge. Similarly, while appellate judges from the 
former Court of Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
initially filled the twelve judgeships on the Federal Circuit, the ma-
jority of these judges retired or took senior status rather than pre-
siding over a dramatically expanded roster of cases. As a result, 
Presidents Reagan and Bush had the opportunity to make eleven 
100 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1994). This jurisdictional grant gives these courts a singular 
ability to shape the development of takings law. In particular, subject only to the discretionary 
review of the Supreme Court, these courts have the power to determine the viability of critical 
environmental laws including the wetlands provision of the Clean Water Act, the habitat 
protection provisions of the Endangered Species Act, and the rail banking provision of the 
Rails-to-Trails Act. 
101 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164 (1982). 
Hrl Philip R. Miller, The New United States Claims Court, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 7, 7---B (1982). 
H13 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1994). Unlike most federal judges, who receive lifetime appointments, 
Court of Federal Claims judges are appointed for terms of 15 years. See 28 U.S.C. § 172 (1994). 
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appointments to the Federal Circuit, and to name eight of the eleven 
judges currently serving on the court.104 
b. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
Presidents Reagan and Bush used their eleven appointments to the 
Federal Circuit to create the nation's most activist conservative court 
on takings issues. They accomplished this by appointing judges who 
were well trained as political operatives. For example, Judge Randall 
Rader was appointed to the Federal Circuit after serving for nearly 
eight years as Judiciary Committee counsel to Senator Orrin Hatch 
(R-Utah).l06 Judge Robert Michel, similarly, was appointed to the 
bench after serving as a top aide and counsel for Senator Arlen 
Specter (R-Pa.). Judge Robert Mayer served in the Reagan admini-
stration as deputy to current Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals judge 
Alex Kozinski during Kozinski's stint as Special Counsel at the Merit 
Systems Protection Board.1°O 
Unquestionably, however, the most activist and influential Rea-
gan/Bush appointee has been S. Jay Plager. Judge Plager, who lists 
Federalist Society membership on an official biography,107 was ap-
pointed to the bench by President Bush in 1989 after several years at 
the forefront of President Reagan's attack on federal environmental, 
health, and safety regulations. At the end of President Reagan's sec-
ond term, Judge Plager simultaneously served as Administrator of 
the OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs , 108 and as 
Executive Director of President Reagan's Vice-Presidential Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief.109 
104 See Huffman I, supra note 74, at 599 n.14 (stating that "because the Federal Circuit was 
a new court in 1983, most of its members were appointed during the Reagan and Bush Admini-
strations, thus creating somewhat more philosophical agreement among its members than exists 
on other courts of appeals"). 
I05Judge Rader worked as Steve Markman's deputy counsel on the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee (chaired by Senator Orrin Hatch) and then, after Markman left to head judicial selection 
at the Justice Department, see supra note 92 and accompanying text, briefly moved up to Chief 
Counsel before being named to a position on the Court of Federal Claims. President Bush 
subsequently promoted Judge Rader to a position on the Federal Circuit. 
106 Terence Moran, Nominee's Pentagon Speech Questioned, LEGAL TIMES, May 18, 1987, at 
6. 
107 See 1996 JUDICIAL STAFF DIRECTORY 851-52. 
108 See generally SUSAN J. 'lbLCHIN & MARTIN 'lbLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA-THE 
RUSH TO DEREGULATE (1983). 
109 Former Hoosier Dean to be Nominated to Court, UPI, Oct. 2, 1989, available in LEX IS, 
UPI File; see Steven Waldman, Watching the Watchdogs, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 20, 1989, at 34. 
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At OMB, Judge Plager headed a staff of 60 employees who were 
responsible for ensuring that the benefits of regulations promulgated 
by federal agencies outweighed the costs of the regulation to indus-
try.110 With the advent of Reagan's Executive Order on takings, Judge 
Plager's office at OMB was also given a central role in assessing the 
takings implications of new federal regulations. l11 As Executive Di-
rector of the of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Judge Plager 
served as the conduit between industries seeking relief from regula-
tory burdens and the administration officials empowered to grant 
such relief.112 
c. The Court of Federal Claims 
Presidents Reagan and Bush followed a similar pattern in filling 
slots on the Court of Federal Claims. As Clint Bolick, the Litigation 
Director for the Institute for Justice, has noted: 
The Claims Court is a place where the Reagan and Bush Admini-
strations have been able to place top-notch conservative judges 
without getting much attention. That is the result of liberals being 
somewhat asleep at the switch and the Administrations' being ex-
tremely sophisticated in their selection and placement of 
judges.113 
Most notably, Reagan appointed Loren Smith, a member of Presi-
dent Nixon's Watergate defense team and general counsel to Presi-
dent Reagan's 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns,114 as Chief Judge 
of the Court of Federal Claims. 
110 See Robin E. Folsom, Comment, Executive Order 12,630: A President's Manipulation of 
the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause to Achieve Control Over Executive Agency 
Regulatory Decision Making, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 639,650 (1993) (discussing the role 
OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) played in implementing Reagan's 
Executive Orders on costibenefit analysis (E.O. 12,291) and takings (E.O. 12,630». The author 
cites numerous sources for the proposition that the OIRA became "a vehicle for influencing and 
coercing agency actions." [d. at 651. 
III Exec. Order 12,630, supra note 90 (requiring that agencies identify and address takings 
implications in submissions to OMB); Folsom, supra note 110, at 687 (stating that "the [Takingsl 
Order adds weight to the cost-side of proposed regulations that have takings implications. This 
allows an opportunity for OMB to prevent agencies from implementing any regulations with 
takings implications."). 
112 Folsom, supra note 110, at 649 ("[tlhe Task Force worked together with American indus-
tries to determine which regulations were overly burdensome to those industries and needed 
to be relaxed"). 
113 W. John Moore, Just Compensation, 1992 NAT'L J. 1404, 1406. 
114 See Richard Miniter, The Shifting Ground of Property Rights, INSIGHT, Aug. 23, 1993, at 
4. 
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Judge Smith, who calls Professor Epstein one of his intellectual 
heroes,115 is the judiciary's most vocal cheerleader for the Takings 
Project. 11fiThe "darling of conservative members of Congress,"117 
Judge Smith has regularly accepted invitations to testify on behalf of 
property rights legislation. In the 104th Congress, for example, Judge 
Smith testified in favor of the provisions of Senator Dole's Omnibus 
Property Rights Bill of 1995, arguing that the bill was necessary to 
"correct[] procedural and structural problems faced by [takings] liti-
gants." While disclaiming any opinion on the substantive provisions in 
the bill, Judge Smith asserted that Congressional action was needed 
to protect "some of the most vital interests of any free society" and 
to free himself and his colleagues from the burden of "the appearance 
of anti-democratic law-making in order to honor their oath and decide 
a takings claim."118 This term, Judge Smith has testified in favor of 
procedural reform bills that would expand his court's jurisdiction over 
takings cases.119 
Judge Smith has also championed property rights on the lecture 
circuit.120 Between 1995 and 1996, for example, Judge Smith was re-
imbursed by the Federalist Society for speeches to at least six Society 
115 David Helvarg, Legal Assault On the Environment, THE NATION, Jan. 30,1995, at 126. 
116 With his handlebar mustache and affinity for performing magic tricks, Judge Smith has 
shown what one reporter called a "clear penchant for the limelight." Castleton, supra note 87, 
at 16. See also Loren Smith, Introduction to National Legal Center for the Public Interest's 
Seminar on Regulatory 1hkings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 525, 525 (1995). 
Id. 
The National Legal Center for the Public Interest [a conservative legal foundation 
devoted to private ownership of property] asked me to write this introduction to this 
symposium on regulatory takings. Why should I have been asked? Maybe because they 
knew I would accept? Possibly. Or perhaps it was because the court upon which I serve 
hears all money claims ... against the federal government? Likely reason. Or perhaps 
because I have been associated with the Center in the past as an author and speaker? 
That's it! 
117 Terry Carter, The Court Conjurer, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 73. 
118 The Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 605 Before the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, l05th Congo 2-4 (1995) (statement of Loren Smith). 
119 See generally The Thcker Act Shuffle Relief Act of 1997: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration and Claims ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Congo (1997) (statement 
of Loren A. Smith). 
120 In addition to the speeches discussed above, see The Federalist Society for Law and Public 
Policy Studies, Lawyers Chapters Focus Attention on Judicial Activism, Local Self-Govern-
ment, THE FEDERALIST PAPER, May 1997, at 3 (reporting on a speech Judge Smith gave to the 
Society's Sacramento chapter entitled "Life, Liberty and Whose Property" in which Judge 
Smith "touched upon the Takings Clause as well as the importance of property rights in 
preserving democracy and free expression"). 
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chapters.121 The year before-the same year Judge Smith awarded a 
coal company $300 million in a takings case because the government 
would not allow strip mining of an environmentally sensitive prop-
erty122-Judge Smith was flown to 'llicson, Arizona to give a speech 
to the National Coal Lawyers Association.123 His introduction to a 
symposium conducted by the National Legal Center for the Public 
Interest, an umbrella group for conservative legal foundations, is 
characteristic of Judge Smith's clarion calls for judicial activism in 
favor of developers: 
[t]he reason takings jurisprudence is such a challenge for the 
judiciary and the legal system, however, is that the other protec-
tions for our economic liberty have vanished; thus, takings law has 
become the only area where citizens can seek any redress from 
the legal system for government intrusion. . . . This puts enor-
mous strain on takings doctrine and the courts. The cases are 
asked to do the work the Framers assigned to all three branches, 
and perhaps most importantly to the States and their tripartite 
governments .... But for good or ill, this task has devolved on the 
courts, and they must do their job to make the Fifth Amendment's 
takings guarantee as real as other constitutional protections we 
hold so dear. 124 
Judge Smith's most lasting accomplishment may well stem from his 
intense lobbying of behalf of himself and President Reagan's other 
appointees to the Claims Court. Recall that under the FCIA, Claims 
Court judges were appointed to 15-year terms. This provision created 
both the opportunity for Reagan to appoint every judge on the Claims 
Court and the downside that a successor with very different views on 
the constitutionality of efforts to protect the environment could simi-
larly remake the court and reverse the direction of its jurisprudence. 
Because of Judge Smith's lobbying effort, President Clinton's op-
portunity to remake the Claims Court is not materializing. Shortly 
after being named Chief Judge, Judge Smith lobbied and ultimately 
121 See Loren A. Smith, Financial Disclosure Report (June 14, 1996) (on file with authors). 
122 Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 411, 416 (1994) (ruling that Whitney 
Benefits was entitled to compound interest on an early judgment by Judge Smith awarding 
Whitney $60 million for the taking of the right to strip mine coal). See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. 
United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), modified, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), afl'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (raising 
the government's liability to over $300 million). 
123 See Loren A. Smith, Financial Disclosure Report (July 17, 1995) (on file with authors). 
124 Smith, supra note 116, at 525; see also, Castleton, supra note 87, at 1 (quoting Judge Smith: 
"to the extent that New Deal jurisprudence became identified with basically saying economic 
rights don't exist ... then its contrary to the Constitution and has to be ignored"). 
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convinced the federal judiciary's Administrative office, headed by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, to recommend significant changes to the 
tenure system for Claims Court judges.l25 As a consequence of these 
reforms, Claims Court judges that request, but do not receive reap-
pointment automatically receive "senior status" and can continue to 
hear cases. This tenure system makes it difficult for the Clinton 
Administration and future presidents to significantly alter the Court's 
ideology.126 
2. The Supreme Court 
Presidents Reagan and Bush were also very successful in appoint-
ing justices to the Supreme Court who are sympathetic to the Takings 
Project. Takings cases in the Supreme Court in recent years have 
been very contentious and very close. In each case, Reagan and Bush 
appointees, typically led by Justice Antonin Scalia, have formed the 
block necessary for a property owner victory.127 For example, in the 
Court's 1994 decision in Dolan v. Tigard, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
(President Reagan's choice to be Chief Justice) was joined by four 
Reagan and Bush appointees (Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Kennedy) in siding with the landowner. Similarly in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, the same five justices constituted five of 
the six votes received by Lucas. As a result of these appointments to 
the high court, when President Bush left office in 1993, six of the nine 
then-sitting justices were very sympathetic to arguments made by 
developers.128 
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 178(b) (1995); see also Terry Carter, U.S. Claims Court Anxious 7b Secure 
Further Respect, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 3,1992, at 1. 
126 While President Clinton, if he chooses, can appoint judges to take the positions of the 
judges President Reagan appointed whose terms are expiring, he cannot prevent these judges 
from continuing to hear cases and continuing to draw a federal salary equal to that of a judge 
in active service. See 28 U.S.C. § 178(e). 
127 See Robert Meltz, The Property Rights Issue, Congo Res. Serv., No. 95-200A (Jan. 20,1995). 
[V]otes in several of the Court's recent land use/taking cases make unequivocally plain 
that where a justice stands on the taking question may depend largely on his or her 
political philosophy. Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, generally regarded as among the 
Court's most conservative members, have emerged as strong advocates for greater 
private property protection. Justices generally regarded as liberal or moderate, such 
as Stevens and Blackmun, have usually taken the government side. Compounding the 
importance of this ideological element is the fact that many of the recent land use/tak-
ing cases in the Court were decided on razor-thin margins. 
Id.; see generally Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme 
Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099 (1997). 
128 President Clinton may have succeeded in shifting the balance in takings cases to five to 
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Not surprisingly, the justice leading the Supreme Court in revising 
takings doctrine has been Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia, a colleague 
of Professor Epstein's at the University of Chicago Law School, had 
served as the faculty advisor to Lee Liberman and David McIntosh 
in founding the Federalist Society.l29 Liberman, while at the Justice 
Department, helped prepare Justice Scalia for Senate confirmation 
hearings. During his first term on the bench (the term he authored 
the Court's opinion in Nollan) , Justice Scalia hired Liberman and 
Gary Lawson, two of the five co-founders of the Federalist Society, to 
be his law clerks.l30 Calabresi, a third Society founder, clerked for 
Justice Scalia the following year. l3l 
At the end of President Bush's term in office, therefore, judges 
sympathetic to the Takings Project dominated the Federal Circuit 
and the Court of Federal Claims and held a solid majority on the 
Supreme Court. The stage was set for a successful litigation campaign 
to use those judges to advance the Takings Project. 
III. THE TAKINGS PROJECT 
With supportive judges sitting in critical places in the federal judi-
ciary, a large and still growing collection of corporations, non-profit 
law firms, and think tanks has assembled to assist developers in 
bringing takings cases through the court system and to these judges. 
A. The Courthouse Lawyers 
At the center of the Takings Project is a nationwide network of pro-
development, non-profit legal foundations that bring takings cases 
free-of-charge to their clients. At least 12 active organizations-the 
Pacific Legal Foundation, the Mountain States Legal Foundation, the 
Institute for Justice, the New England Legal Foundation, the De-
fenders of Property Rights, the Southeastern Legal Foundation, The 
Northwestern Legal Foundation, the Oregonians in Action Legal 
Center, the Texas Justice Foundation, the Stewards of the Range, the 
Landmark Legal Foundation, the Washington Legal Foundation-
four by replacing Justice White, who typically sided with property owners, with Justice 
Ginsburg! who, at least in Dolan, sided with the City of Tigard. It is too early to tell whether 
President Clinton's appointment of Justice Breyer to replace Justice Blackmun-an impassioned 
supporter of land use regulation-will have any impact on the Court's Takings Clause jurispru-
dence. 
129 See Al Kamen, Scalia s Federalists from Justice, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1986, at A23. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
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with a combined budget in excess of $15 million litigate takings cases 
on behalf of developers. l32 
These non-profits act as the highest profile courthouse lawyers in 
the Takings Project. Dubbing property rights the "civil rights issue 
of the '90S,"133 they have adopted what Charles Fried termed an 
"ACLU-type constitutional litigation strategy" for turning Professor 
Epstein's flawed theory on takings law into the law of the land.134 As 
one participant declared: "I look upon us as the bearers of the torch 
of the civil rights movement .... I see us as successors to Martin 
Luther King and Thurgood Marshall."136 
The leading force in this litigation campaign is the Pacific Legal 
Foundation (PLF). Formed in Sacramento in the early 1970s by for-
132 See National Directory of Non-Profit Organizations (1997-1998 ed.); ECON. AMERICA, INC., 
THE RIGHT GUIDE, A GUIDE TO CONSERVATIVE AND RIGHT-OF-CENTER ORGANIZATIONS 
(Derk Arend Wilcox 1997) [hereinafter THE RIGHT GUIDE]; Roger K. Newman, Public-Interest 
Firms Crop Up on the Right, Suits with Agendas, NAT'L L.J. Aug. 26, 1996, at 22 ("funding 
from upwards of 500 corporations and foundations provides a $3.5 million annual budget [for the 
Washington Legal Foundation], matched only by that of the Pacific Legal Foundation"); Insti-
tute for Justice (visited Feb. 6, 1998) <http://www.instituteforjustice.org> (Institute's FY 1996 
budget exceeds $2 million). See also DAVID HELVARG, THE WAR AGAINST THE GREENS, at 
21-22 (1994). 
Id. 
The Defenders [of Property Rights] works closely with the Federalist Society, the 
Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the Washington Legal Foundation, three mem-
bers of a nationwide network of twenty-two pro-business, public interest law firms that 
do anti-environmental lawsuits and litigation on a pro bono basis, providing the anti-
green movement with tens of millions of dollars in free legal services. 
133 See Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: Haw It Began and Where It Is 
Headed, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990's PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 24 (Bruce Yandle ed., 
1995) ("Just as segregation led to the civil rights movement ofthe 1960s, government intrusion 
on property rights-largely in the name of protecting the environment-has sparked a new 
crusade to protect an individual's right to use and own all forms of and interests in private 
property."). 
134 See Fried, supra note 60, at 48-49. Starting in the early 1930s-at the same time President 
Roosevelt began transforming the federal judiciary-the NAACP began a campaign to bring 
sympathetic civil rights plaintiffs to the Supreme Court. This campaign allowed the Court to 
gradually expand the category of constitutionally protected rights of minorities in this country 
and ultimately led to the Court's monumental anti-segregation ruling in Brown v. Board of 
Education. See generally KLUGER, supra note 8. This model was later adopted by other groups 
such as the American Civil Liberties Union, which won important victories for free speech and 
the free exercise of religion. 
135 Richard Perez-Pena, A Rights Movement that Emerges from the Right, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
30, 1994, at B6 (quoting Richard Samp of the Washington Legal Foundation). Of course, the 
same groups-most prominently the Pacific Legal Foundation and the Institute for Justice-
that are leading the Takings Project are also simultaneously fighting to limit the effectiveness 
of the civil rights laws and Supreme Court opinions that represent an important part of Justice 
Marshall's and Dr. King's life work. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Political Right's Point Man on 
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mer assistants to Governor Ronald Reagan, PLF has spent, in their 
words "a quarter of a century devoted to defending property rights, 
the free enterprise system, and the concept of limited government."136 
PLF's goal, like Epstein's, is to use the Takings Project as a way to 
"'get rid of the regulatory state established under F.D.R.'s New 
Deal."'137 
Begun with a single office and a $100,000 budget, PLF has grown 
with the Takings Project and has become a national organization with 
offices in five states, a budget of over $4 million, and a litigation docket 
consisting of sixty of the most important takings cases from around 
the country.13B PLF only represents a small number of plaintiffs in the 
time-consuming and expensive early stages of litigation.139 Typically, 
PLF will monitor cases from around the country, weigh in with an 
amicus brief as a case reaches a federal appellate court or a state 
supreme court, and then, if the case has a sympathetic plaintiff and 
presents an important issue upon which PLF desires Supreme Court 
review, PLF will assist the landowner in petitioning the Supreme 
Court to review the case.140 PLF has filed a brief in favor of the 
property owner in every important Supreme Court regulatory tak-
ings case that has been heard by the Court since the mid-1970s.141 
Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at A24 (calling Clint Bolick of the Institute for Justice "the 
leading voice in attacks on Government programs that give breaks to minority groups and 
women"); Maura Dolan, Giving the Right Its Day in Court, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at Al 
(reporting that PLF is representing California Governor Pete Wilson in "his attempt to elimi-
nate five state laws designed to help women and minorities get state jobs and state contracts"); 
Kendall & Ryan, supra note 11, at M5. 
136 PACIFIC LEGAL FOUND., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT (1997). 
137 David Helvarg, Legal Assault on the Environment, THE NATION, Jan. 30, 1995, at 126 
(quoting Jim Burling, PLF's Litigation Director). 
138 See generally PACIFIC LEGAL FOUND., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT. 
139 See Jack Woodward, David v. Goliath: Pacific Legal Foundation Is Changing Regulatory 
Law in the United States, undated PLF pamphlet (on file with authors); Robert P. King, 
Property Rights Cmsaders Move in on Florida Growth Laws, THE PALM BEACH POST, May 
29, 1997, at lA ('''We only take precedent-setting cases .... Our effort is to change the law."') 
(quoting Richard R. Bradley, PLF's Director of Strategy and Development). One of the rare 
exceptions was the Nollan case, where PLF represented the Nollans from the initial filing 
through the Supreme Court. See Woodward, supra. 
140 Dolan, supra note 135, at Al ("Foundation lawyers comb newspapers looking for cases that 
have a chance of going to the U.S. Supreme Court and in which they can offer friend-of-the-court 
arguments. Like-minded conservatives also refer cases, and the group occasionally represents 
people who call with problems."). That, for example, was the role played by PLF in last term's 
Suitum v. California Coastal Commission, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1997). PLF submitted an amicus 
brief for Ms. Suitum in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and then, when Suitum lost that 
appeal, offered to represent Ms. Suitum before the Supreme Court. 
141 PLF's prominent role in bringing conservative arguments to the Supreme Court appears 
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The campaign has been a remarkable success for PLF. PLF has 
either represented the plaintiff or assisted the plaintiff in obtaining 
Supreme Court review in each of the last four important regulatory 
takings cases heard by the Supreme Court,l42 and the property owner 
has prevailed in each of the cases.l43 These cases, in turn, have set the 
stage for even more dramatic victories in the Federal Circuit and 
other lower federal courtS.I44 As PLF founder and past-President 
Ronald Zumbrun boasted, "[ w]e see the '90s as our decade .... We 
have the weapons-court precedent, experienced personnel, and 
credibility."145 
The Institute for Justice has also been playing an increasingly large 
role in takings litigation. The Institute was founded in early 1991 by 
William Mellor, a Reagan administration official and a former litigator 
for the Mountain States Legal Foundation,146 and Clint Bolick, a vet-
eran of the Meese Justice Department and a former assistant to 
Justice Clarence Thomas when Justice Thomas chaired the EEOC. 
The Institute spends its more than $2 million annual budget to con-
vince conservatives that "'conservative judicial activism' is neither an 
oxymoron nor a bad idea."147 
The Institute's Center for Private Property Rights both litigates 
cases on behalf of developers and supports developers in cases 
brought by other groupS.148 The Institute distinguishes itself from 
to have made a fan of at least one Supreme Court justice. Justice Scalia, at Stanford Law School 
to give a lecture to the Federalist Society, advised Robert Corry, now a PLF attorney, that PLF 
was a place Corry could find work in constitutional law that would blend with Corry's conser-
vative ideology. See Dolan, supra note 135, at A16. 
142 See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1997); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
143 See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 293; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003; Nollan, 483 
U.S. at 825. 
144 See infra Section IV. 
145 H. Jane Lehman, Oumers Aren't Giving Ground in Property Battles, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 
9, 1992, at 1. 
146 Institute for Justice, Staff Biography, supra note 132. 
147 See Institute for Justice, supra note 132, The Court of Public Opinion (quoting George F. 
Will). See also William H. Mellor, III, Can Washington Change?, REASON, Aug. 18, 1996, at 26. 
The more propitious focus for libertarians should be away from issues defined by 
Washington politics and on such matters as establishing a rule of law conducive to a 
society of free and responsible individuals. Whether the issue is economic liberty, 
property rights, or the First Amendment, the Constitution provides a means to check 
Washington's real-world impact .... 
[d. (quoting William H. Mellor, III). 
148 See Institute for Justice, supra note 132, Electronic Brochure, Institute for Justice Ap-
proach: Private Property Rights. 
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other legal foundations by being able to claim that it is not just in-
spired by Professor Epstein, it has Epstein on its payroll. In three 
recent Supreme Court takings cases, Lucas, Dolan, and Suitum, 
Professor Epstein has co-authored an amicus brief on the Institute's 
behalf. 149 
A third organization, the Defenders of Property Rights (DOPR), 
claims itself as "[t]he nation's only legal defense foundation dedicated 
exclusively to the protection of property rights."I50 Founded by the 
husband and wife team of Roger and N ancie Marzulla, two veterans 
of both Mountain States Legal Foundation and the Meese Justice 
Department,151 DOPR boast that it has won thirteen of the fifteen 
property rights cases in which it has acted as lead counsel and has 
assisted property owners in sixty-one other cases.152 
The non-profit law firms that are working takings cases through 
the courts coordinate with each other through regular meetings in 
Washington, D.C., hosted by the Heritage Foundation. Edwin Meese, 
who started the Takings Project more than a decade ago continues to 
play an important role in overseeing its progress. According to three 
published reports, Meese, now a Ronald Reagan fellow at the Heri-
tage Foundation, Co-Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Federalist 
Society, and a Board Member of the Defenders of Property Rights, 
oversees the regular meetings at the Heritage Foundation that coor-
dinate the activities of the participants in the Takings Project.l53 
The legal foundations are assisted in the litigating takings cases by 
an army of pro bono lawyers from private law firms. This pro bono 
149 See generally Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (No. 96-243); Brief of the Institute 
for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) 
(No. 93-518); Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 91-453). 
160 THE RIGHT GUIDE, supra note 132, at 122. 
161 Margaret Kriz, Nancie G. Marzulla: Taking Root in Property Rights, NAT'L J., Oct. 3, 
1996, at 2133. 
152 THE RIGHT GUIDE, supra note 132, at 122. 
163 See James Andrews, Conservative Law Groups Adopt the Liberal Model, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Oct 3, 1994, at 13 (Meese conducts monthly meetings of "the growing field of conser-
vative and libertarian lawyers who battle for property rights and against the regulation they 
consider harmful to economic growth"); Roger K. Newman, Public Interest Law Firms Crop 
Up on the Right, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 26, 1996, at A22 ("One of the behind-the-scenes forces in 
coordinating such legal campaigns has been Edwin Meese III .... He chairs a monthly meeting 
in Washington of representatives of upwards of a dozen groups that network, exchange ideas 
and discuss what each is doing."); see also HELVARG, supra note 132, at 21-22 ("a nationwide 
network of twenty-two pro-business 'public interest' law firms ... coordinate through an annual 
meeting sponsored by the Heritage Foundation"). 
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network amplifies the forces marshaled by conservative non-profits.154 
For example, in 1993, Washington Legal Foundation reported that 
forty-eight law firms, including top Washington, D.C. law firms such 
as Arnold & Porter and Covington & Burling, donated pro bono 
services to WLF.155 
The largest player in organizing this effort is the Federalist Society. 
The Society has expanded its efforts to attract practicing lawyers in 
recent years and now has a lawyers division with over 18,000 mem-
bers of 59 active chapters.156 A central focus of this expansion has been 
the establishment of a pro bono resources network that links conser-
vative lawyers who wish to litigate on behalf of conservative and 
libertarian causes and legal foundations, such as PLF, which conduct 
such litigation.157 The Society reports that over 1,000 members have 
joined this network.158 
The Institute for Justice runs a similar network dubbed the Human 
Action Network (HAN). HAN is comprised of over 300 lawyers that 
have participated in the Institute's lawyer and law student training 
programs. HAN seeks to "broaden our movement's impact exponen-
tially" by enlisting lawyers and law students trained by the Institute 
to bring cases that further the Institute's ideological agenda.159 
154 See Newman, supra note 153, at A22 ("Conservative law firms ... tak[el advantage of 
millions of dollars of pro bono time offered by law firms."); FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 1996 ANNUAL 
REPORT 8 (1997); William G. Castagnoli, What Is the WLF and Why Is It Challenging the FDA?, 
MED. MARKETING & MEDIA, Apr. 1995, at 27, 28, 32. 
155 See Castagnoli, supra note 154, at 28, 32. 
156 See FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 4, 10. 
157 See id. at 8 (listing the Institute for Justice, the Pacific Legal Foundation, and the Wash-
ington Legal Foundation as among the organizations that have taken advantage of the Society's 
"pro bono apparatus"). 
158 See id. 
159 As takings challenges have become more viable, an increasingly lucrative for-profit practice 
in representing property owners has developed, encouraging the founders of the more promi-
nent legal foundations to establish for-profit affiliates to litigate takings cases on behalf of 
fee-paying developers. See Love Your Work?, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 24,1997, at 3. 
Noted environmental and property rights lawyer Roger Marzulla has left the D.C. 
office of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld to open shop with his wife Nancie 
Marzulla. Marzulla & Marzulla ... is sharing space with the nonprofit Defenders of 
Property Rights, where Nancie Marzulla doubles as President. The new firm is pri-
marily representing smaller clients in litigation against the government. 
Id.; THE RIGHT GUIDE, supra note 132, at 253. PLF also contracted the Sacramento firm of 
Zumbrun, Best & Findley for management and legal services. See id. The firm was paid $212,661. 
See id. The firm is affiliated with PLF president Ronald Zumbrun, who is paid as an independent 
contractor through the firm. See id. 
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A final group of important players guiding takings cases through 
the courts are the associations representing developers. The largest 
player in this industry-based effort is the National Association of 
Home Builders (NAHB). With 190,000 members, a $48 million bud-
get,1oo a staff in excess of 350, and 850 affiliated state and local asso-
ciations nationwide,161 the N AHB is one of the nation's best organized 
and most powerful lobbying organizations. l62 The NAHB role in tak-
ings cases has traditionally been limited to filing amicus briefs in 
support of developers in important takings cases and in supporting 
local associations in litigating cases.l63 In several recent cases, how-
ever, the NAHB has delved more directly into the fray by bringing a 
series of cases as plaintiffs on behalf of its members.l64 
B. Training Lawyers and Judges 
The non-profit organizations leading the takings campaign also 
spend considerable resources both in training the army of pro bono 
counsel, counsel for developers, and private practitioners that assist 
them in litigating takings cases and in training and rewarding the 
judges that provide them with critical victories in takings cases. 
160 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 1890 (1998 ed.). 
161 DIRECTORY OF ASSOCIATIONS 100 (1997 ed.). 
162 Another important player is the California-based Building Industry Legal Defense Foun-
dation (BILD). BILD, an offshoot of the Southern California Building Industry Association, has 
a mission to "defend the legal rights of home and property owners" and to "secure a body of 
favorable court decisions for its members specifically, and property owners and developers 
generally." Briefs Amici Curiae of the National Association of Home Builders and the Building 
Industry Legal Defense Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 1-2, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 3233 (No. 96-243) (listing "myriad" of Supreme Court cases 
in which the NAHB has appeared as an amicus on behalf of developers). 
163 See id.; Steve Kerch, Builders Seek Protection of Property Rights, CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 25, 
1987, at 1 ("The [NAHB] has a litigation program that aids local associations in certain cases 
where suits to protect property rights are involved."). 
164 See generally National Ass'n of Home Builders v. City of Los Angeles, No. 96-55274, 1997 
U.S. App. LEXIS 13877 (9th Cir. June 9, 1997); National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Chesterfield 
County, No. 95-3213, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 18838 (4th Cir. June 30, 1996); National Ass'n of 
Home Builders v. Babbitt, 949 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Commerce Clause challenge to habitat 
regulation under Endangered Species Act). Ironically, in bringing these suits, the associations 
for developers rely on the liberalized rules of standing won primarily by advocates for environ-
mental protection. See generally United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Bennett 
v. Spear, a case decided by the Supreme Court last term, the N AHB and BILD successfully 
argued (as amici) to extend standing to developers to sue the federal government challenging 
protection of species under the Endangered Species Act. See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 
1169 (1997). 
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1. Lawyer Training 
The most important actor in the lawyer training effort is again the 
Federalist Society. The Society's Lawyers Division operates a prac-
tice group on "Environmental Law and Property Rights" to discuss 
topics such as "the 'takings' implications of zoning and major federal 
pollution laws," and conducts workshops training lawyers on bringing 
takings cases.165 The tenor of these workshops can be gleaned from 
the report filed by the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin on a 1992 Feder-
alist Society conference entitled "Takings and the Environment: The 
Constitutional Implications of Environmental Regulations."l66 The 
Bulletin described the seminar as "a national revival meeting for 
takings lawyers" and went on to report, "[eJnvironmental takings are 
hot and the specialty bar knows it. They've tasted blood, and they 
want flesh. Throw them a bone and they'll bite off your arm. They're 
bigger now and, thanks to recent court rulings, they've got teeth."167 
The Bulletin explained this fervor as follows: "[iJt's like they've been 
a suppressed religious cult for years and suddenly gained legitimacy 
and mainstream currency."168 
PLF also conducts takings training seminars in venues across the 
country discussing topics such as "Getting Into State Court," "Trying 
a $200 Million Dollar Regulatory Taking Case," and "Proving Denial 
of All Economically Viable Use." While billed as non-partisan events 
and often co-sponsored by prominent legal organizations such as the 
American Law Institute and the American Bar Association, these 
seminars have a decided ideological slant. Several participants of an 
October 1996 PLF training seminar in Washington, D.C. event de-
scribed the seminar as a "property rights rally" where opposing views 
were repeatedly discredited out-of-hand by the conference chair.169 
Finally, the Institute for Justice plays an important supporting role. 
The Institute hosts "Policy Activist Seminars" each year for practic-
160 THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, MEMBERSHIP & BENEFITS, (undated pamphlet) (on file with 
authors). 
166 Terry Carter, A Natirmal Revival Meeting for Takings Lawyers, CHICAGO DAILY L. 
BULL., Apr. 2, 1992, at 2. 
167 See id. 
168 Id. 
169 Letter from Julia Levin, National Heritage Institute, and Enrico Nardone, National 
Audubon Society, to Charles Alan Wright, President, The American Law Institute, (Oct. 24, 
1996) (on file with authors); see also INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 132, (discussing a 1995 
"policy activist seminar" on property rights where one attendee reports leaving the conference 
"considerably energized and looking eagerly for someone to sue"). 
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ing lawyers intended to "develop a whole new network of conserva-
tive legal crusaders across the country."170 These seminars seem to be 
having the intended impact: Edwin Meese, a speaker at a 1995 semi-
nar declared the seminars to be "one of the more important events in 
the conservative movement."l71 A recent attendee reported leaving 
the conference "considerably energized and looking eagerly for some-
one to sue."172 
2. Training Judges 
Conservative and libertarian non-profits are also devoting sig-
nificant resources to keeping conservative activist judges in the fold. 
A number of non-profit organizations, including the Manhattan Insti-
tute's Center for Judicial Studies, the Liberty Fund and the George 
Mason University's Law and Economics Center, host all-expenses-
paid judicial seminars that discuss libertarian views on topics includ-
ing property rights.173 
The most significant judicial training program, both in terms of 
popularity among judges and in its focus on property rights, are the 
programs for federal judges run by the Foundation for Research on 
Economics and the Environment (FREE). FREE is a Montana-based 
non-profit that promotes "free market environmentalism,"174 a doc-
trine that relies on the free market and private property rights as the 
best protectors of the environment.175 Perhaps the leading legal aca-
170 Institute for Justice, supra note 132. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. (quoting J. Stanley Marshall, Chairman, THE JAMES MADISON INSTITUTE). 
173 See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOR SALE 70-82 (1993). 
174 FREE was founded and is operated by John Baden a "free market environmentalist," who 
along with Richard Epstein serves as an adjunct scholar at the libertarian Cato Institute. See 
Cato Institute (visited Mar. 15, 1998) <http://www.cato.org/>. Baden has long been a vocal 
proponent of strong constitutional protection of property rights. According to Baden, "property 
rights are under siege" from environmental regulations such as the Endangered Species Act, 
John Baden, Property Protection and Property Rights in Harmony, SEATTLE TIMEs, Mar. 30, 
1993, at A7, and "[tjhe Constitution requires due compensation when government takes or 
restricts private owners' property." John A. Baden, A Green Campaign Speech for a Better 
Environment, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at B5. Baden's other conservative credentials 
include editing Environmental Gore, a collection of essays critiquing Vice President Gore's 
Earth in the Balance, which includes contributions by property rights ideologues such as Nancie 
Marzulla, who argues that property rights are the "underpinning" of all the rights protected by 
the Constitution and that private property rights should be society's "central organizing prin-
ciple." See ENVIRONMENTAL GORE 219-21 (John A. Baden ed., 1994) (quoting Vice President 
Gore's EARTH IN THE BALANCE). 
175 See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 
(1993). 
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demic proponent of the free market environmentalism is FREE trus-
tee James Huffman. Huffman, in turn, is Professor Epstein's most 
consistent proponent and one of the few academics to vocally promote 
judicial activism on behalf of property owners.176 
Since 1992, FREE has offered a series of seminars for federal 
judges. The seminars provide judges with free travel and accommo-
dations at a ranch resort near Bozeman, Montana to obtain their 
presence at lectures that, in their words, "emphasiz[e] property 
rights, market processes and responsible liberty."177 As FREE ex-
plains: "[o]ur seminars in environmental economics and policy provide 
federal judges economic, scientific and ethical insights when they hear 
environmental cases. We explain how secure property rights, en-
trepreneurial innovations and the market process can improve envi-
ronmental policy.1I178 FREE boasts that nearly one-third of the federal 
judiciary has either attended or asked to enroll in a future FREE 
seminar and that, in 1996, nearly 150 federal judges applied for fifty-
four seminar openings. FREE's seminars have been particularly pop-
ular with the judges on the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal 
Claims Courts that are revolutionizing federal takings law. Judges 
Michel, Mayer, Newman, Rader, and Plager of the Federal Circuit, 
and Chief Judge Smith, and judges Futey, Robinson, Turner, and Yock 
from the Court of Federal Claims all attended FREE Seminars; 
Judges Plager and Michel have each attended two FREE seminars 
since 1992.179 
FREE's judicial seminars are funded by the same foundations-the 
Olin Foundation, the Carthage Foundation and the M.J. Murdoch 
Foundation-that are funding groups such as the Pacific Legal Foun-
dation, the Defenders of Property Rights and the New England Legal 
Foundation that litigate takings cases in courts such as the Federal 
Circuit. For example, the Olin Foundation simultaneously funded the 
176 See Huffman II, supra note 74, at 177 ("Epstein is on the right track in urging judicial 
activism .... "); Huffman I, supra note 74, at 609 (praising Judge Plager's opinion in Florida 
Rock, but suggesting that it could have been improved by an even closer adherence to the 
doctrine outlined by Professor Epstein). Huffman also serves as a board member of the Orego-
nians in Action Legal Center, a non-profit property rights group with a mission to "protect 
Constitutional rights of landowners ... through litigation." See THE RIGHT GUIDE, supra note 
132, at 251-52 (noting that group litigated Dolan v. City of Tigard before Supreme Court). 
177 FREE invitation to federal judge, Jan. 7, 1996 ("conference and travel expenses are paid 
and time is provided for cycling, fishing, golfing, hiking, and horseback riding") (on file with 
authors). See FREE (visited Mar. 15, 1998) <http://www.free-eco.org/free>. 
178 See FREE, supra note 177. 
179 Judges' Financial Disclosure forms (copies on file with authors). 
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New England Legal Foundation to litigate on behalf of the property 
owners in Preseault v. United States/BO and FREE to provide judicial 
seminars for the Federal Circuit judges that decided to hear Pre-
seault en bane and ruled in favor of the NELF.1B1 Similarly, the M.J. 
Murdoch Foundation has been a large contributor to FREE1B2 and to 
the Pacific Legal Foundation/&'! which has appeared before the Fed-
eral Circuit as an amicus supporting the property owner in the semi-
nal Florida Rock Industries v. United States and Loveladies Harbor 
v. United States cases.1B4 Finally, through the Carthage Foundation, 
Richard Scaife is the largest single contributor to FREEl85 and PLF/86 
and one of the largest supporters of the Defenders of Property 
Rights, "[t]he nation's only legal defense foundation dedicatedexclu-
sively to the protection of property rights."lB7 Richard Scaife also 
heads the Sarah Scaife Foundation, one of the largest contributors to 
NELF.1BB 
180 In 1994, the Olin Foundation gave $35,200 to the New England Legal Foundation, the 
plaintiffs counsel in Preseault, for "property rights litigation." JOHN M. OLIN FOUND., INC., 
1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1994). 
181 In 1995, the Olin Foundation gave $25,000 to FREE to support its judicial seminars. JOHN 
M. OLIN FOUND., INC., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT (1995). FREE attendees, Judges Plager, Mayer, 
Newman, and Rader provided four of the six votes for Preseault. See Preseault v. United States, 
100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Judges' Financial Disclosure Forms (copies on file with authors). 
182 M.J. MURDOCK CHARITABLE TRUST, 1993 GRANTS APPROVED BY CLASSIFICATION 
($78,000 grant to FREE); M.J. MURDOCK CHARITABLE TRUST, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT ($150,000 
grant to FREE in 1995). 
188 M.J. MURDOCK CHARITABLE TRUST, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT ($200,000 to PLF in 1996); 
1994 FOUND. GRANTS INDEX 330 ($200,000 grant from Murdock to PLF in 1992); M.J. MURDOCK 
CHARITABLE TRUST, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT ($200,000 to PLF in 1994). 
184 See generally SARAH SCAIFE FOUND., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1995) (reporting grants 
to PLF of $200,000 and $175,000, respectively). Scaife's 1995 Annual Report makes special note 
of PLF's work in litigating property cases: "[flor more than twenty years, the Pacific Legal 
Foundation has supported the preservation of individual and economic freedoms as set forth in 
the Constitution. Its successes in litigating property rights cases ensure its position as a leader 
in strengthening these guarantees for the general public." See id. Scaife granted $200,000 to 
PLF "to enable the Pacific Legal Foundation to continue its work." See id. 
186 See CARTHAGE FOUND. 1993, 1995, & 1996 ANNUAL REPORTS (reporting grants to FREE 
of $100,000 a year for each of the last four years); 1993 FOUND. GRANTS INDEX 655 ($100,000 
grant to FREE in 1990). 
186 1994 FOUND. GRANTS INDEX 327 (reporting that in 1991 Carthage granted $75,000 to 
PLF); 1993 FOUND. GRANTS INDEX 307 ($275,000 in grants to PLF in 1990). 
187 See THE RIGHT GUIDE, supra note 132, at 122. 
188 The question of whether attending these seminars violates any ethical restrictions imposed 
upon federal judges appears to be an open one. The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 provides that 
judges, shall not "accept#'1ything of value from a person ... whose interests may be substan-
tially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the individual's official duties" unless 
the gift is permitted under "reasonable exceptions" established by the Court's ethics office. See 
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C. Procedural Reform Legislation 
This term in Congress, proponents of the Takings Project, most 
notably the National Association of Homebuilders, turned to the Pro-
ject's congressional supporters for legislation designed to grease the 
wheels of the Takings Project.189 In particular, the NAHB draftedl90 
and turned the full force of its lobbying capability behind the Private 
Property Implementation Act of 1997 (H.R. 1534).191 H.R. 1534 (and 
its Senate companion bill, S. 1204) would expand the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts over takings claims, eliminate procedural require-
ments that encourage judicial restraint (such as the requirement that 
potential litigants "exhaust" non-judicial relief before bringing suit), 
and require the government to pay the legal fees of developers who 
win in court. Despite the strong opposition of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, thirty-seven state attorneys general, the Ameri-
can Planning Association, the National Governors Association, the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, the National League of 
Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, H.R. 1534 passed the 
House of Representatives on October 22 by a 248 to 178 vote. l92 The 
5 U.S.C. § 7353(a)(2)-(b)(1) (1994). The Court's ethics office, the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, in turn, has approved judges attending educational seminars unless "the 
sponsor, or source of funding, is involved in litigation, or likely to be so involved, and the topics 
covered in the seminar are likely to be in some matter related to the subject matter of such 
litigation." Advisory Committee on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Opinion No. 67. The questions 
of whether the required inquiry into the "source of funding" for the seminars reaches to the 
foundations funding FREE, and whether the foundations that simultaneously fund FREE and 
litigation in the Federal Circuit are "involved" in litigation within the meaning of the advisory 
opinion have not, to date, been addressed by the Administrative Office. 
189 The proponents of the Project turned to procedural reform after spending much of the 
l04th Congress trying, unsuccessfully, to pass legislation changing the substantive standards 
applicable to takings cases. See Allan Freedman, Property Rights Advocates Climb the Hill to 
Success, CONGo Q., Oct. 25, 1997, at 2591. 
190 See John Brinkley, Lobby Gave Landawner Property Rights Measure, VENTURA COUNTY 
STAR, Nov. 5, 1997, at Al ("Rep. Elton Gallegly said his bill to give landowners expedited access 
to federal courts was written for the benefit of 'ordinary landowners,' but, in fact, its author 
was an attorney for the National Association of Home Builders."). See also Jim Vande Hei, Home 
Builders, Pressured By GOp, Stay Out of N.Y., ROLL CALL, Oct 23,1997, at 1. "According to 
documents obtained by Roll Call, officials of the Home Builders wrote Rep. Elton Gallegly's 
(R-Calif.) private property bill, a top issue for the association that hit the House floor yesterday." 
[d. 
191 See Freedman, supra note 189, at 2591. "It is a classic tale of Washington influence and 
how a single association responsible for $295,250 in campaign contributions in the first six 
months of 1997 and $57,500 in soft money contributions to both par.s mobilized support with 
a small army of lobbyists .... " [d. 
192 See generally Nancy Petersen, Legislation Would Make Federal Case of Land Use, PHILA. 
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Senate equivalent, S. 1204, has now garnered thirty-one co-spon-
sors.193 
Equally notable simply for its audacity is Senator Orrin Hatch's 
(R-Utah) Citizens Access to Justice Act of 1997 (S. 1256) and its 
companion bill in the House of Representatives (H.R. 992). Intro-
duced during the same term Senator Hatch brought the judicial ap-
pointments process almost to a standstill by attacking "judicial activ-
ism,"l94 Senator Hatch's takings bill would expand significantly the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and other federal district 
courts to hear takings cases against the federal government, giving 
takings plaintiffs the opportunity to forum-shop between their local 
federal district court and the Court of Federal Claims.195 Moreover, to 
"assure uniformity in property rights law," Senator Hatch's bill would 
vest in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals exclusive appellate ju-
risdiction to hear takings cases against the federal government from 
every district court in the nation. While declaring, in other words, 
that "a judicial activist on the left or the right, is not, in my view, 
qualified to sit on the federal bench,"196 Senator Hatch's legislation 
would reward the nation's most activist court on property rights with 
significant new power to shape the direction of takings law in this 
country. As this Article was going to the publisher, the House of 
Representatives passed H.R. 992 on a 230-180 vote, and the Senate 
Judiciary Committee voted Senator Hatch's proposed takings legisla-
tion out of committee by a ten to eight party-line vote. 
INQUIRER, Feb. 22,1998; see also Letter from Judicial Conference of the United States to Rep. 
Howard Cobb, Sept. 29, 1997 (on file with authors); Letter from state attorneys general to Rep. 
Henry J. Hyde, Sept. 24, 1997 (on file with authors); Letter from National League of Cities and 
U.S. Conference of Mayors to Rep. Cobb, Sept. 24, 1997 (on file with authors); Letter from 
American Planning Association to Rep. Hyde, Sept. 16, 1997 (on file with authors). 
193 See The Library of Congress, Thomas (visited Mar. 15, 1998) <http://thomas.loc.gov/>. 
194 See S. 1254, 105th Congo § 5 (1997) (creating, if enacted, a new, federal cause action for all 
takings claims whether for declaratory or monetary relief and vesting the Court of Federal 
Claims and the district courts with concurrent jurisdiction over this new cause of action). The 
result would be to permit the Court of Federal Claims to hear claims for declaratory relief and 
expand the district court's ability to hear claims for money damages exceeding $10,000. See id. 
195 See S. 1256, 105th Congo § 4(6) (1997). 
196 Anthony Lewis, The War on the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at A23. Even though 
President Clinton has generally appointed more moderate, older, more experienced jurists to 
the bench than his predecessors, the Senate confirmed just 17 judges in 1996-the lowest 
election-year total in over 40 years-and 36 judges in 1997. See id. The article calls "the 
campaign by the far right to block President Clinton's appointments to the Federal Courts" "as 
important as any political effort in this country today." Id. 
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D. Bankrolling the Takings Project: The Funding Vision of 
William Simon and Richard Mellon Scaife 
Finally, a word about the sponsors. While the Takings Project has 
received funding from every major conservative foundation and a 
wide variety of corporations, developers and individuals,197 the cam-
paign is, to a remarkable extent, the funding vision of two prominent 
conservative philanthropists: William Simon, now president of the 
Olin Foundation, and Richard Mellon Scaife, chair of the board of both 
the Carthage and the Sarah Scaife Foundations. These two funders 
have helped start or maintain virtually every non-profit organization 
playing an important role in the Takings Project. In many, if not most 
cases, these foundations are the organizations' largest single contribu-
tors. 
Simon, the Treasury Secretary under Presidents Nixon and Ford, 
wrote a blueprint for organizing the conservative agenda in his 1979 
book Time for Truth. 198 In it, Simon argues that "[fJunds generated by 
business (by which I mean profits, funds in business foundations and 
contributions from individual businessmen) must rush by multimil-
lions to the aid of liberty . . . to funnel desperately needed funds to 
scholars, social scientists, writers and journalists who understand the 
relationship between political and economic liberty."199 Since then Si-
mon, first at the Institute for Educational Affairs (lEA) (which Simon 
helped found in 1978 with Irving Kristo1)200 and now as the President 
of the Olin Foundation, has worked to transform that blueprint into 
reality. At lEA, Simon simultaneously granted money to Epstein to 
help publish Takings and helped start the Federalist Society. The 
Foundation he now runs, the John M. Olin Foundation, grants over 
$20 million to conservative causes each year. Among Simon's regular 
grantees are Takings Project participants: the Cato Institute's Center 
for Constitutional Studies,201 the Federalist Society,202 FREE,203 
197 See Woodward, supra note 139 (discussing 20,000 donors). 
198 WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH (1978); see also STEFANIC & DELGADO, supra 
note 92, at 90. 
199 STEFANIC & DELGADO, supra note 92, at 90. 
200 See id. at 110. According to Stefancic and Delgado, the lEA was formed by the John M. 
Olin, Sarah Scaife, JM, and Smith Richardson foundations to serve as a clearinghouse for 
corporate philanthropy, linking conservative scholars and thinkers seeking funding with corpo-
rations and foundations wishing to further a conservative public policy agenda. See id. at 109-10. 
In 1990, the lEA merged with the Madison Center and became the Madison Center for Educa-
tional Affairs. [d. 
201 See JOHN M. OLIN FOUND., INC., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 9 ($75,000 grant). 
202 See id. at 13 ($240,000 in grants). 
203 See id. at 14 ($25,000 grant). 
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George Mason's Center for Law and Economics,204 the Institute for 
Justice,205 the Landmark Legal Foundation,206 the Pacific Legal Foun-
dation,207 and the Washington Legal Foundation.208 
Scaife's support has been even more extensive both in length and 
breadth. The Wall Street Journal has called Scaife "the financial arch-
angel for the [conservative] movement's intellectual underpinnings"209 
and this title fits the role he has played in the Takings Project. In the 
1980s, the Sarah Scaife Foundation was among the largest foundation 
funders of the Federalist Society, the Institute for Educational Af-
fairs, and many of the then-fledgling legal foundations.21o For example, 
in 1987, the Foundation awarded $60,000 to both the Federalist Soci-
ety and the Institute for Educational Affairs, $110,000 to the Pacific 
Legal Foundation and the Washington Legal Foundation, and $25,000 
to the Southeast Legal Foundation.211 
In the 1990s, Carthage has been the single largest contributor to 
FREE,212 the Defenders of Property Rights,213 and the Washington 
Legal Foundation,214 and a generous contributor to the Landmark 
Legal Foundation.215 The Sarah Scaife Foundation regularly funds the 
Cato Institute's Center for Constitutional Studies,216 PLF,217 NELF,218 
Atlantic Legal Foundation,219 Southeastern Legal Foundation,220 the 
204 See id. at 15 ($200,000 grant for its "institutes in law and economics for federal judges"). 
200 See id. at 18 ($125,000 grant). 
206 See JOHN M. OLIN FOUND., INC., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 20 ($25,000 grant). 
207 See id. at 23 ($60,000 grant). 
208 See id. at 31 ($200,000 grant). 
209 Phil Kuntz, Citizen Scaife: Heir Turned Publisher Uses Financial Largess to Fuel Con-
servatism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1995, at Al. 
210 See FOUNDATION GRANTS INDICES (12th-20th eds.). 
2JJ See 1989 FOUNDATION GRANTS INDEX 651-52. 
212 See generally CARTHAGE FOUND., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT; CARTHAGE FOUND., 1995 AN-
NUAL REPORT; CARTHAGE FOUND., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT (reporting $100,000 grants in three 
of the last four years). 
213 See CARTHAGE FOUND., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT; CARTHAGE FOUND., 1995 ANNUAL RE-
PORT; CARTHAGE FOUND., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT; CARTHAGE FOUND., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 
($100,000 grants in 1994-1996, $50,000 grant in 1993). 
214 See CARTHAGE FOUND., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT ($200,000 in 1996); CARTHAGE FOUND., 
1995 ANNUAL REPORT ($450,000 in 1995); CARTHAGE FOUND., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT ($350,000 
in 1994); CARTHAGE FOUND., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT ($800,000 grant in 1993). 
215 CARTHAGE FOUND., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT; CARTHAGE FOUND., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 
($125,000 in 1995) 
216 See SARAH SCAIFE FOUND., INC., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT ($25,000 grant for Cato's Center 
for Constitutional Studies, which "focuses on the awareness and protection of economic liberties 
with particular emphasis on the 'taking issue."'). 
217 See SARAH SCAIFE FOUND., INC., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 1995 ($200,000 grant). 
218 See id. ($50,000 grant). 
219 1995 FOUND. GRANTS INDEX ($75,000 grant in 1994). 
220 See SARAH SCAIFE FOUND., INC., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT ($50,000 grant). 
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Pacific Legal Foundation,221 the Institute for Justice,222 and George 
Mason's Law and Economics Center.223 
IV. THE RESULTS: WILL THIS BE THE END OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW? 
To this point, this Article has focused entirely on Professor Ep-
stein's theory that the Takings Clause could be used to roll back 
decades of health and safety regulations and the campaign by anti-
regulatory ideologues to transform Professor Epstein's polemic on the 
Constitution into a body of case law. In this section, we turn to the 
results of that campaign. For what is most remarkable about the 
Takings Project is not that it exists, but rather that it is succeeding. 
The combined efforts of the Project have succeeded in creating in the 
federal courts a sympathetic environment for developers and a hostile 
environment for communities seeking to defend innovative efforts to 
protect land use. This judicial environment, in turn, has produced a 
transformation in takings law that bears startling similarities in both 
form and substance to Professor Epstein's blueprint. 
A. Judicial Activism for the Takings Project 
Professor Epstein's book Takings was a call for judicial activism or, 
as Epstein put it: "a level of judicial intervention far greater than we 
have now, and indeed far greater than we ever had."224 Judges on the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, led by Justice Scalia and 
Judge Plager, have answered Epstein's call and have reached across 
seemingly insurmountable jurisdictional and procedural barriers to 
take and decide key takings cases.225 
221 See 1993 FOUND. GRANTS INDEX 307 ($275,000 in grants in 1990). 
222 See SARAH SCAIFE FOUND., INC., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT ($75,000 grant). 
223 See id. ($125,000 grant). 
224 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 30. 
225 In addition to the Supreme Court cases discussed infra, see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374; 412-14 (1994) (Souter J., dissenting) (questioning whether the facts of the case raised 
the question answered by the majority and arguing the case could have been decided without 
creating a new takings doctrine); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322-23 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that plaintiff 
had not even raised a takings challenge in its complaint and noting that the state court had 
remanded to the trial court on distinct grounds for liability-raising the possibility that the 
plaintiff would have won remuneration on non-Constitutional grounds). 
In addition to the federal circuit cases, see Florida Rock Industries v. United States, 18 F.3d 
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1. Supreme Court 
The Nollan v. California Coastal Commission case provides a good 
early example.226 Nollan addressed a regulation that required devel-
opers of beachfront lots to obtain a permit from the California Coastal 
Commission if they wished to substantially increase the surface area 
of development on such lots.227 Typically, when granting such a permit, 
the Coastal Commission demanded a concession from the landowner 
to mitigate the harm caused by the development.228 In particular, in 
Nollan, the Coastal Commission demanded that the Nollans allow the 
public to pass along the beach below a sea wall that separated the 
Nollans' house from the ocean.229 
To reach the merits, the Supreme Court had to overcome a number 
of procedural obstacles.230 As an initial matter, the Court had to ignore 
questions about whether the N ollans even owned the beachfront pas-
sageway that the state allegedly "took" through their regulation.231 
As California argued in Nollan, California only sought a passageway 
on land that was frequently below the mean high tide mark and, thus, 
arguably state property.232 Responding to this aspect of the Nollan 
case, Eban Moglan, then a law clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
now a law professor at Columbia University, wrote: "[n]ot content 
with granting [Supreme Court review] in all takings cases in which 
the state wins, the Court has now moved on to granting review in 
takings cases which aren't cases at all."233 
The Court also had to ignore the fact that, while the N ollans' permit 
appeal was pending, the N ollans built their beach house without a 
1560,1573 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Neis, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Judge Smith had rejected Florida 
Rock's partial takings claim (finding instead that Florida Rock had suffered a complete denial 
of economic use) and Florida Rock had not appealed that ruling). As Judge Neis argued 
persuasively in dissent, the so-called "law of the case" should govern the partial takings issue 
and should not have been addressed by the Federal Circuit. See Florida Rock., 18 F.3d at 1573 
(Neis, C.J., dissenting); see also Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(granting en banc review sua sponte). 
226 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
227 See id. at 828-31. 
228 See id. 
229 See id. 
230 See id. 
231 See generally Nollan, 483 U.S. at 847-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
232 See Government's Brief at 6, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 
86-133); see also Motion of Appellee California Coastal Commission to Dismiss at 3, Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (Civ. B-004663). 
233 See Government's Brief, supra note 232, at 6; see also Bench Memorandum at 3, Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (Civ. B-D04663). 
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permit. Under California law, this illegal, unilateral action by the 
Nollans waived the Nollans' right to challenge the conditions imposed 
on their development permit. California raised this point in seeking 
dismissal of the Nollans' appeal, and, as even the Meese Justice De-
partment admitted, it is "settled beyond dispute" that a litigant must 
follow state procedures in raising a federal constitutional claim, and 
that unless the state procedures are unreasonable, failure to do so will 
deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction.234 The Court, however, 
simply denied California's motion without comment and proceeded to 
address the merits of the N ollans' claim. 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a 1992 case involving a 
development restriction imposed by South Carolina's 1988 Beachfront 
Management Act,235 provides an even stronger example.286 The first 
hurdle cleared by Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court was ripeness.237 
South Carolina had amended the Beachfront Management Act before 
the Supreme Court reviewed the case and, under the new Act, Mr. 
Lucas could have applied for a special permit to build on his seaside 
lots.23B As a result, Lucas' permanent takings claim-the only claim he 
had prevailed upon at trial and the only claim he appealed to the 
Supreme Court-was not ripe because Lucas had never applied for a 
permit under the new Act.239 Indeed, Justice Scalia admitted as much, 
concluding in the first pages of his opinion that Mr. Lucas' permanent 
taking claim was not ripe.240 Instead of dismissing the case, however, 
the Court decided to address a question that had not even been 
briefed by the parties-whether Mr. Lucas has suffered a temporary 
taking between 1988, when the initial Act was passed, and 1990, when 
the Act was amended.241 
This creative hurdling of the ripeness barrier created another pro-
cedural problem: standing. As Justices Blackmun and Stevens pointed 
out in dissent, Lucas had not built on his property for 18 months 
before the ban on development went into effect and had testified at 
trial that he was "in no hurry" to build on his vacant lot, "because the 
lot was appreciating in value."242 As importantly, the trial court had 
234 See Government's Brief, supra note 232, at 6. 
236 See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 et. seq. (Law Co-op. 1989). 
236 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
237 See id. at 1010-13. 
238 See id. at 1010-11. 
239 See id. at 1011. 
240 See id. at 1011-12. 
241 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1042 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
242 [d. at 1043 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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made no findings of fact that Lucas had any plans to use the property 
between 1988 and 1990.243 In short, after a trial on the merits on his 
claims, including his temporary takings claim, Lucas had not shown 
that he was injured in any way by not being able to construct a 
residence from 1988 to 1990. As a result, Lucas lacked the "injury-in-
fact" predicate necessary to have standing to bring a temporary tak-
ings claim. As Justice Scalia had opined just days before in denying 
standing to an environmental organization in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, "'some day' intentions-without any description of concrete 
plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will 
be-do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that 
our cases require."244 
Justice Scalia responded by arguing that Lujan was decided at 
the summary judgment stage while Lucas' claim for a temporary 
taking was decided "at the pleading stage."245 This, however, as Jus-
tice Blackmun points out, was not the case: Lucas had a trial on the 
merits of his claim for "damages for the temporary taking" of his 
property and failed to demonstrate any imminent or concrete plans 
to build on or sell the lot.246 In short Lucas did not (and probably could 
not) show that he had any intention of building on his property be-
tween 1988 and 1990, and, therefore, under a seventeen-day-old Su-
preme Court case, he lacked standing to even bring his temporary 
taking case before the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, Justice Scalia's willingness to ignore the trial court re-
cord on the issue of standing contrasts markedly with his strict ad-
herence to the trial court's finding that South Carolina's development 
restriction had rendered Lucas' property "valueless." Four justices, 
including Justice Kennedy, noted the painfully obvious truth: a beach-
front lot on the Isle of Palms in South Carolina is not "valueless," even 
if you can't build a house on it. But this factual finding was critical 
to Justice Scalia's ruling for Lucas and Justice Scalia ignored the 
State's plea to re-examine it. For the first time in the case, Scalia 
became a stickler for procedural detail: ruling that because the State 
had not challenged the erroneous factual predicate in opposing Su-
preme Court review, the Court would "decline to entertain" the 
state's argument on this point.247 
243 See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
244 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992). 
245 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012-13 n.3. 
246 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 1043 n.5. 
247 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020 n.9. 
558 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:509 
Richard Lazarus, the attorney for the Coastal Council before the 
Supreme Court, aptly summarizes the Court's disposition of Lucas as 
follows: 
[t]he majority surmounted a range of obstacles to reach the merits 
of the case, including ripeness, standing, and the sheer improb-
ability of the lower court's factual findings .... The Court's gen-
erosity towards the landowners contrasts sharply with its refusal 
to consider the state government's challenge to the trial court's 
finding of fact ... [t]he Lucas majority was clearly determined, 
and impatient, to issue a ruling favorable to the landowner.248 
2. The Federal Circuit 
Judges on the Federal Circuit and, in particular, Judge Plager, have 
displayed an even greater determination to reach takings cases over 
jurisdictional hurdles. The best example is the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion that it had the authority to hear the claim asserted in Loveladies 
Harbor v. United States.249 In Loveladies, the developer filed suit in 
the Court of Federal Claims at the same time it had pending in federal 
district court in New Jersey a suit seeking similar relief for the same 
alleged taking.250 This violated 28 U.S.C. section 1500, which states 
that "[t]he United States Court of Federal Claims shall not have 
jurisdiction of any claims for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his 
assignee has pending in any other court .... "251 
As the government forcefully noted in seeking dismissal, the plain 
words of section 1500, and recent Federal Circuit precedent, prohib-
ited the Federal Circuit from hearing Loveladies' claim. Indeed, just a 
year before, in UNR Industries v. United States, the Federal Circuit 
sitting en bane engaged in "a comprehensive effort to set out the 
248 Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1418, 
1420-21 (1993); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1062 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the majority 
was "eager to decide the merits" of Lucas' claim); id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the 
court presses on to decide the issue, and as it does, it ignores its jurisdictional limits, remakes 
its traditional rules of review and creates simultaneously a new categorical rule and an exception 
(neither of which is rooted in our prior case law, common law, or common sense)"); id. at 1077 
(Souter, J., statement) (noting the ''imprudence of proceeding to the merits in spite of these 
unpromising circumstances"). 
249 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
250 See id. at 1547. The Court of Federal Claims notes that large portions of the complaint.!' 
filed in the two cases were "copied one from the other." See id. at 1553; see also id. at 1559 
(Mayer, J., dissenting) (noting the similarities in the claims filed by Loveladies in the two federal 
courts). 
251 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (1994). 
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proper interpretation" of section 1500.262 In UNR the court concluded 
that "[c]orrectly construed, section 1500 applies to all claims on what-
ever theories that 'arise from the same operative facts."'253 The court 
expressly overruled Casman v. United States,264 and other cases 
which had excused adherence to section 1500 where the claims in the 
two suits seek different forms of relief, finding Casman inconsistent 
with the plain language of section 1500.255 
To reach the merits of Loveladies' takings claim, Judge Plager 
convinced five judges to join him in reversing course again.256 Finding 
the plain language of section 1500 was no longer so plain, Judge Plager 
resurrected the Casman exception.257 Judge Plager noted that while 
the Supreme Court had affirmed the UNR opinion, the Court had 
declined to reach the question of "whether two actions based on the 
same operative facts, but seeking completely different relief, would 
implicate S. 1500."258 From this, Judge Plager concluded that the 
"Supreme Court took exception to our efforts" and that therefore, 
"anything we said in UNR regarding the legal import of cases [like 
Cas man] whose factual bases were not properly before us was mere 
dictum."259 Judge Plager then proceeded to apply the Cas man excep-
tion to the Loveladies case (even though Loveladies' actions sought 
roughly the same relief), and used Loveladies to significantly advance 
the Takings Project.260 
A three judge dissent took on every aspect of Judge Plager's opin-
ion.261 As an initial matter, the dissent decried the majority's decision 
to even revisit the court's opinion in UNR.262 The dissent reminded 
Judge Plager that the Supreme Court had affirmed UNR, and that 
262 UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1992), aff'd sub nom., 
Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993). 
253 See id. at 1023 (citation omitted). 
254 Casman v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956). 
250 See UNR Indus., 962 F.2d at 1023-25. 
206 Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554-56 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
257Id. at 1551-52. 
268 See id. at 1548-49 (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 211 (1993». 
259 Id. at 1548. 
260 See infra text accompanying notes 238-55. 
261 The dissent was written by Judge Mayer and joined by Judge Rader, two usually reliable 
supporters of developers. Indeed, the dissent went out of its way to note that ''the claims of 
these property owners might well be valid on the merits," and less than a month later Judge 
Rader joined Judge Plager's opinion on the merits in Loveladies. See Loveladies, 27 F.3d at 1558 
(Mayer, J., dissenting); see also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 
1994). 
262 See Loveladies, 27 F.3d at 1556-60 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
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the Supreme Court "said nothing by way of disapproval of our ruling 
on Casman."263 The dissent also noted that the "at the very least, one 
would expect reversal of our so recent en bane precedent to be sup-
ported by some compelling reason," but that such "special justifica-
tion" was "missing from today's undertaking.'I264 
On the merits, the dissent rejected Judge Plager's "judicial revi-
sion" of section 1500.265 The dissent reminded Judge Plager that "it is 
axiomatic that courts cannot extend their jurisdiction in the interest 
of equity" and reiterated the logic of the court's opinion in UNR: 
[I]n UNR we concluded that section 1500 should be applied ac-
cording to its plain words, and that instrumental to such applica-
tion was a single, coherent definition of the word "claim" as refer-
ring only to the facts underlying the petitioner's action against the 
government .... We overruled Gas man because it was in conflict 
with this interpretation.266 
Finally, the dissent criticized Judge Plager's "machinations" in 
fitting Loveladies claim into the newly resurrected exception created 
in Casman. As the dissent noted, the majority "ignores the words of 
the complaints" in which Loveladies requested almost the same relief 
in both actions, "substituting instead its understanding of what Love-
ladies must have intended by the several suits."267 
The dissent concluded with a rhetorical question. Noting that only 
a year before, "nine of the ten judges hearing [UNR] said that Cas-
man was unsound and inconsistent with section 1500," the dissent 
wondered "why six of them now think otherwise."268 Judge Plager 
appears to answer the dissent's question in the final pages of his 
opinion: 
[t]he nation is served by private litigation which accomplishes 
public ends, for example, by checking the power of the Govern-
ment through suits brought under the APA or under the [T]ak-
ings [C]lause of the Fifth Amendment. Because this nation relies 
in significant degree on litigation to control the excesses to which 
Government may from time to time be prone, it would not be 
263 [do at 1558 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
264 [do at 1556-58 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
265 [do at 1558 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
266 [do at 1557 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
267 LO'IJeladies, 27 F.3d. at 1559 (Mayer, J., dissenting). Judge Plager, "reading the two com-
plaints in light of the legal and factual circumstances in which they were drawn" concluded that 
the complaints were "for distinctly different and not the same or even overlapping relief." [do 
at 1554. 
268 [do at 1558 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
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sound policy to force plaintiffs to forego monetary claims in order 
to challenge the validity of Government action .... 269 
561 
This portion of Loveladies suggests that, in Judge Plager's mind, the 
"sound policy" of hearing cases that "control the excesses" of govern-
ment trumps the need to respect precedent or the plain language of 
the laws written by Congress.270 
B. The Progress So Far 
To see the success of the Takings Project, it is necessary to recall 
the status of takings law in 1985. At that point, Penn Central Trans-
portation v. New York City and its progeny defined the law of regu-
latory takings and, under Penn Central, a regulatory takings was 
generally not found unless the market value of a "parcel as a whole" 
was decreased by 90% or more.271 Even then, a regulation could be 
saved from a takings challenge by proof that the regulation was 
necessary to prevent a broadly defined category of nuisances.272 
As outlined above, Professor Epstein's proposed rewrite of the 
Takings Clause required several significant revisions to Supreme 
Court takings doctrine including: recognition of "partial takings," a 
radical revision of the nuisance exception, and a closer look at the link 
between the means and ends of land use regulation.273 The Takings 
Project has succeeded in introducing each of these concepts into the 
constitutional dialogue. Preliminary and tentative versions of these 
doctrinal shifts have gained a foothold in the Supreme Court. Ex-
trapolating from these tentative steps, the Federal Circuit and the 
lower federal courts have adopted bolder, more fully realized versions. 
This much success for a theory at the fringe of constitutional theory 
is troubling and significant. The success is troubling in that the doc-
trines are built on a textual interpretation of the Takings Clause that, 
as demonstrated above, cannot withstand serious scrutiny. The suc-
cess is significant in that cases decided already-particularly the Fed-
eral Circuit's decision in Florida Rock Industries v. United States274-
are impacting the operation of important laws such as the wetlands 
provision of the Clean Water Act.275 The success is also significant 
269 [d. at 1555-56. 
270 [d. 
271 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1977). 
272 See infra notes 321-29 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. 
274 See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
275 See, e.g., Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 1997 WL 428516 (Fed. Cir. 
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because the Takings Project has the potential to put all modern envi-
ronmental and land use laws at risk.276 
1. The Partial Takings Doctrine 
The most critical and controversial aspect of Professor Epstein's 
theory is the notion that the Takings Clause permits (and, indeed, 
demands) judicial oversight and interference with all regulations that 
impact property value, even those regulations with minor or even 
minute impacts. It is this aspect of his theory, his "partial takings" 
doctrine, that permits the clause to "invalidate[] much of the twenti-
eth century legislation."277 
Epstein's partial takings doctrine flows from his anachronistic no-
tion that acquisition of private property provides the private property 
owner with a full and complete set of rights of ownership, independent 
of custom or law.278 Under Professor Epstein's theory, the institution 
of private property contains no gaps-there are no residual rights 
that remain with or can be transferred to the public or the govern-
ment. Any law that restricts the disposition, possession or use of 
property is a taking; there is no line between partial and total takings. 
Professor Epstein's partial takings theory thus depends on two 
critical doctrinal points. First, the notion that property can be divided 
into a bundle of rights and that each stick in the bundle is protected 
by the Takings Clause.279 Second, that any infringement on any stick 
Jul. 31, 1997) (reversing a ruling that a 28% diminution in value was not a taking and ruling 
that, under Florida Rock, a court must always evaluate the extent to which a regulation 
interferes with investment-backed alternatives and the character of the government action 
before denying a takings claim). 
276 Blumm, supra note 48, at 198 ("[U]nless the Supreme Court reverses Florida Rock, all 
federal environmental regulations are in jeopardy, and environmental law, as we have come to 
know it in the last quarter century, is over."). 
277 EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 283. 
276 As Professor Blumm notes, Epstein's notion that "property and the individual exist in a 
kind of state of nature ... is fundamentally inconsistent with both recent Supreme Court rulings 
and vintage Anglo-American philosophy, which acknowledge that property rights are social 
constructs, creatures of the state." See Blumm, supra note 48, at 182. 
279 For an interesting discussion of how the modern notion of property as rights (or incidents), 
not things, has skewed takings doctrine see Leif Wenar, Essay, The Concept of Property and 
the Thkings Clause, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1923 (1997). Professor Wenar comments that "[l]ike a 
rogue star, the Scientific conception of property as rights has drawn academic interpretations 
of the Takings Clause farther and farther out of their orbits, until they can no longer be seen 
from Earth," and argues for an interpretation of the Takings Clause based on a return to the 
"ordinary notion of property as things and that is sensitive to the multiform possibilities of 
modern divided ownership and the many powers of modern government." Wenar, supra, at 1945. 
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in the bundle, including for example a partial loss in use, is a taking 
and must be compensated as such.280 Since 1980, the Supreme Court 
has adopted the first of Epstein's two prongs; the Federal Circuit has 
adopted both. 
a. The Supreme Court 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has adopted a takings jurispru-
dence that looks at the impact of regulation on individual strands in 
the bundle of property rights. In Penn Central, the Supreme Court 
reiterated its traditional focus on the "parcel as a whole," declaring 
that "'[t]aking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into dis-
crete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particu-
lar segment have been entirely abrogated."281 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
was alone in his dissent in that case, which argued that the regulation 
at issue caused a taking of one strand: the owner's air rights.282 Begin-
ning with Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV in 1982, how-
ever, the Court began to move away from a focus on the parcel as a 
whole and toward an assessment of the impact of regulation on a 
single strand.283 
The first and least surprising of these cases, Loretto,284 was decided 
in 1982, while Epstein was still writing Takings. In Loretto, the Court 
ruled that when the government extinguishes the right to exclude 
by permanently occupying property, a per se takings occurs. While 
Loretto edged the Court toward a bundle of rights analysis by finding 
a taking primarily based on the impact the regulation had on one 
strand in the bundle, it did not represent a full-scale adoption of the 
concept.285 The strand in Loretto, after all, was the right to be free of 
280 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 57-62. Professor Epstein's theory, thus, cherry-picks from 
competing conceptions of property, selecting from the modern conception of property the notion 
of property as a bundle of rights, while adopting the older Classical Liberal notions regarding 
the sanctity of private property with the result that, in his view, ownership rights in each stick 
in the bundle are nearly absolute. As Professor Grey points out, however, Epstein cannot have 
it both ways. If he is going to adopt the broad modern notion of private property, he must also 
adopt the modern notions of "greatly enhanced toleration of their infringement." Grey, supra 
note 14, at 21, 30. 
281 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); see also Radin, supra 
note 2, at 1676-77. 
282 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 142--44. 
283 See Radin, supra note 2, at 1677. 
284 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) 
285 Indeed, the Court through Justice Marshall went to great lengths in Loretto to disclaim 
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physical invasions and, as the Court noted, permanent physical inva-
sions had always been treated differently.286 
A much larger step toward adoption of the "sticks in the bundle" 
approach to takings law came in 1987 in the Court's opinion in Hodel 
v. Irving.287 In Hodel, a group of Native Americans challenged a fed-
erallaw which extinguished their right to pass on to their heirs small, 
extremely divided interests in larger parcels. The Court found a 
taking despite recognizing the law had a minimal economic impact on 
the Native Americans and did not interfere with investment-backed 
expectations.288 Central to the Court's analysis was the "extraordi-
nary" nature of the government regulation: that is, that it "amounts 
to virtually abrogation" of the landowners' rights in one "strand" of 
the bundle of property rights.289 
The Court took the final and perhaps most important step in Lucas, 
where the Court ruled that complete abrogation of the right to use 
property can constitute a taking. With Lucas, the Court's adoption of 
the first prong of Epstein's theory was essentially complete.290 The 
Court declared that each of the critical strands in the bundle-the 
right to use, exclude others from, and dispose of property-is pro-
tected by the Takings Clause and that abrogation or elimination of a 
single strand in the bundle is a taking.291 
The Court has not yet, however, moved beyond the finding that a 
taking occurs for a complete loss of one strand to the second and more 
radical aspect of Professor Epstein's theory: the notion that a partial 
(as opposed to a complete) infringement of a property interest can be 
a taking. Indeed, even in recent opinions, the Court has firmly re-
any notion that it was finding a takings simply because of the impact on the right to exclude. 
See id. at 435 ("[p ]roperty rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights 'to possess, 
use and dispose of it .... To the extent that the government pennanently occupies physical 
property, it effectively destroys each of these rights."). The Loretto Court also made clear that 
a similar rule should not apply to other sticks in the bundle, stating that "deprivation of the 
right to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in every case, independently sufficient to 
establish a taking." [d. at 435-36. 
286 See id. at 426 ("we have long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a 
property restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings Clause"). 
287 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
288 See id. at 715-16. 
289 [d. at 716. 
290 Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027--30 (1992) (citing Andrus 
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), a case prohibiting the sale of eagle feathers, for the proposition 
that strands in the bundle of "personal" property (as opposed to land) may be abrogated without 
compensation). 
291 Severing property into strands in the bundle or incidences of ownership is different from 
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jected such a notion, particularly with regard to partial deprivations 
in the right to use property.292 In Lucas, for example, the Court 
reaffirmed that the Penn Central balancing test applies to regulations 
that restrict, but do not abrogate, the economic use of property.293 In 
Concrete Pipe & Products of California v. Construction Laborers 
Pension Trustfor Southern California, a unanimous Court reaffirmed 
that under Penn Central "mere diminution in value of property, how-
ever serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking."294 Finally, in 
several recent cases, the Court has reaffirmed Justice Holmes' recog-
nition in creating the regulatory takings doctrine 70 years ago in 
Pennsylvania Coal that "government hardly could go on if to some 
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without 
paying for every such change in the general law."295 Each of these 
statements is directly at odds with Epstein's partial takings theory. 
physically severing property into affected and not-affected portions (for example by dividing a 
parcel into its wetland and upland portions). The Court has adopted the first method of severing 
property; it has resolutely rejected the second method. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. 
Construction Laborers Pension Trust for So. Cal., 508 U.S. 602,643-44 (1993) (unanimous Court 
reaffirming Penn Central's holding that "a claimant's parcel of property could not first be 
divided into what was taken and what was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of 
the former to be complete"); cf Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (recognizing difficulty in ascertaining 
in all cases the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured). Both these 
methods of severing property interests, in turn, are distinct from Epstein's partial takings 
doctrine, which holds that any portion of any property interest (however defined) may be 
compensable under Takings Clause. 
292 The Court's treatment of partial takings of other sticks in the bundle is, perhaps, more 
muddled. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419, 426, 435-36 (1982), for 
example, the Court held that a physical invasion of even a small portion of a parcel can be 
considered a taking of the right to exclude. In Youpee v. Babbitt, 117 S. Ct. 727, 733 (1997), a 
case involving a similar, but slightly less restrictive prohibition on the right to devise than that 
at issue in Hodel, the Court ruled that a "severe restriction" of the right to devise can constitute 
a taking. While both these cases could be viewed as accepting a form of partial takings of these 
sticks, there are stronger alternative explanations for both cases. Loretto simply reflects the 
unique and absolute nature of the right to exclude. While involving only a small portion of their 
property, the permanent physical invasion at issue in Loretto (the installed cable box) totally 
and forever abrogated the Lorettos' "right" to exclude all others. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 
(regulation "effectively destroy[sl" right to exclude). Youpee on the other hand is most appro-
priately viewed as a decision by the Court that the restriction on the right to devise was so 
severe that it "went too far" under the Penn Central/Pennsylvania Coal framework. 
293 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
294 See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645. 
295 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994). 
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b. The Federal Circuit 
One would expect that these clear statements by the Supreme 
Court would have settled the partial takings issue, at least until the 
Court itself decided to revisit the issue. Instead, it is here that the 
Federal Circuit has been its most adventurous. Drawing on the gen-
eral pro-developer tenor of much of Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas, 
and dicta concerning the difficulty in determining the property inter-
est at issue in taking cases,296 Judges Plager and Rader of the Federal 
Circuit made a version of Professor Epstein's partial takings doctrine 
the law of the land-at least with respect to federal government 
regulations. 
In Florida Rock, plaintiffs, a commercial mining company, alleged 
that a decision by the Army Corps of Engineers to deny a permit to 
mine the limestone underlying a 98-acre track of wetlands deprived 
the property of all economic value and, thus, constituted an uncom-
pensated taking of private property. After rejecting plaintiffs' "total 
takings" argument because of uncontroverted evidence that the prop-
erty maintained a resale value of at least twice the $1900 per acre 
price Florida Rock originally paid, Judge Plager raised a question 
neither party had briefed or argued. In his words: "[t]he question 
remains, does a partial deprivation resulting from a regulatory impo-
sition, that is, a situation in which a regulation deprives the owner of 
a substantial part but not essentially all of the economic use or value 
of the property, constitute a partial taking and is it compensable as 
such?" 
296 The dicta relied upon by the Federal Circuit is contained in footnote seven of the Lucas 
opinion where Justice Scalia complains about the difficulty in determining "the 'property inter-
est' against which the loss of value is to be measured" and muses that it was "unclear" whether 
the court would treat a regulation that requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural track in its 
natural state "as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of 
the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution 
in value of the tract as a whole." See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. This passage, at most, leaves 
open the possibility of physically severing property by the affected and unaffected portions; it 
does not raise or in any way open the partial takings issue. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. 
United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Nies, J., dissenting) ("[t]he majority seeks to 
shoehorn its 'partial takings' theory into this open question. It does not fit."); see also supra 
note 291. Moreover, any ambiguity stemming from Justice Scalia's dicta was forcefully put to 
rest by a unanimous Court in Concrete Pipe a year before Flurida Rock. See Concrete Pipe, 508 
U.S. at 642 ("to the extent that any portion of property is taken, that portion is always taken 
in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the property taken is all, or only a 
portion of the parcel in question"). Cf, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 
1183 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (adopting a narrow definition of the "parcel as a whole"). 
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The obvious answer to this question is: "only if the regulation fails 
the Penn Central balancing test." After all, Lucas and the Court's 
unanimous opinion in Concrete Pipe reaffirmed that Penn Central's 
three factor inquiry still applies where a regulation diminishes but 
does not abrogate the permissible uses of property.297 Penn Central 
was, in other words, binding Supreme Court precedent, and applica-
tion of Penn Central's balancing test to the facts of Florida Rock 
would have disposed of the case.298 As Chief Judge Nies argued in 
dissent, "[ w ]hile the Supreme Court may rethink and change its rul-
ings, this court is not free to adopt positions in conflict with decisions 
of the Court."299 
But Judge Plager did not consider himself so bound by Supreme 
Court precedent. Noting that Lucas had carved out an exception to 
the Penn Central balancing test, Judge Plager felt free to disregard 
Penn Central completely. In its place, Judge Plager established a rule 
that the government may have to compensate a landowner for any 
regulation that causes a diminution in value, unless there is a "reci-
procity of advantage" by which the landowner receives "direct com-
pensating benefits" from the regulation.30o 
Judge Plager reached this ruling following precisely the two-step 
blueprint drafted by Professor Epstein. Judge Plager begins, as Ep-
stein suggested,301 by erasing the distinction between regulatory tak-
297 See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643-45 (applying Penn Central balancing test). 
298 In Flarida Rock the denial of a mining permit reduced the property's value, at the most, 
by slightly over 60% from $10,500 an acre to approximately $4,000 an acre. See Florida Rock, 
18 F.3d at 1567. Moreover, during the ten-year period Florida Rock owned the property, the 
parcel had actually doubled in value (from $1,900 per acre to $4,000 per acre). See id. at 1562-63. 
The Supreme Court in Penn Central reaffirmed that reductions in market value exceeding 90% 
could be permitted without compensation and the Court "uniformly reject[ed] the proposition 
that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a taking." Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 
(1915), and Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926»; see also Concrete 
Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645 ("mere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient 
to demonstrate a taking"). As Judge Neis noted in dissent, "[a] ditninution in value from denial 
of an economic use (even if the loss can be expressed in property rights terms) is insufficient to 
effect a taking under all Supreme Court precedent so long as substantial other uses are left to 
the owners." Flarida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1573 (Neis, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
299 Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1573 (Nies, C.J., dissenting). 
300 See id. at 1570-71. 
301 EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 57. 
The [partial takings] proposition seems straightforward enough where the state takes 
two acres of land from a four-acre parcel. Prima facie, compensation must be paid for 
the land taken no matter how much land the owner retains. The same principles apply 
no matter what form of division applies. Let the government remove any of the 
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ings and physical invasions.302 Thus, according to Judge Plager, the 
Takings Clause treats both the same: whenever government action 
impinges in any way on an owner's property, a court must look further 
to find whether a taking has occurred.3°S Judge Plager ignored two 
centuries' worth of binding Supreme Court decisions which make 
the difference between physical and regulatory takings a touchstone 
of takings doctrine.304 The distinction did not make sense to Judge 
Plager, so he decided to discard it.305 
Second, Judge Plager obliterated any distinction between incre-
mental diminutions in value and property rights, concluding, in es-
sence, that increments of value are property rights.306 Again, however, 
the premise that "value" is somehow a property right is inconsistent 
with Supreme Court precedent307 and, in this instance, the status quo 
incidents of ownership, let it diminish the rights of the owner in any fashion, then it 
has prima facie brought itself within the scope of the eminent domain clause, no matter 
how small the alteration and no matter how general its application. 
See id. 
300 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1572 ("The fact that the source of a taking is a regulation 
rather than a physical entry should make no difference."). 
303 See id. 
304 See supra Section I. As explained above, the distinction between regulatory and physical 
takings stems from the text of the Takings Clause itself, which applies on its face to physical 
expropriations but not regulations. See id. The Supreme Court has always ruled that compen-
sation is required when property is expropriated, but generally ruled that regulations are 
takings only when the deprivation is so total as to be "akin to an expropriation." See Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (regulation had "very nearly the same effect 
for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it"); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (justifying his rule that total deprivations in use were per 
se takings by noting that "total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowners's point of 
view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation"). 
305 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1572. Of course it is not illogical at all to apply one standard 
to a category of government actions-physical expropriations-which are clearly prohibited by 
the Constitution and a different standard to a second category-regulations-that is prohibited 
only by analogy. The distinction only becomes illogical when you read the clause to equally 
encompass both physical expropriations and regulations. In other words, both Epstein's and 
Judge Plager's arguments about the illogic of applying different tests to regulatory and physical 
takings necessarily depend upon Epstein's "plain meaning" interpretation of the Takings Clause, 
which, as demonstrated above, is irreparably flawed. See supra Section I. 
306 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1572. The majority "sees no distinction in a property right, 
an economic use and a loss of value. However, I will address lost value separately from property 
rights because the concepts, which may be the same under 'Iaw-and-economics' theories, are not 
interchangeable in established takings jurisprudence." [d. at 1575 (Neis, C.J., dissenting). 
307 See id. at 1575 (Neis, C.J., dissenting) (noting that in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 
(1945), and other Supreme Court cases the Court demanded "an identification of the specific 
property interest to be transferred"). 
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in all fifty states.308 It was consistent, however, with Professor Ep-
stein's theory.309 
With these two radical steps, Judge Plager achieved, at least for 
now in the Federal Circuit, the principal objective Epstein set out to 
accomplish a decade before: interpretation of the Takings Clause to 
require heightened judicial scrutiny of any regulation that reduces 
the value of private property. Gone is the distinction between physical 
and regulatory takings that has been a mainstay of the Court's inter-
pretation of the Takings Clause for two hundred years. Gone too is 
what is perhaps the single most important rule in takings doctrine: 
Penn Central's category of regulatory actions that are generally not 
takings-those that reduce property value by less than 90%.310 
Florida Rock demonstrates what Professor Blumm called an "un-
precedented vision of judicial activism."3ll The activism is Judge 
Plager's, who has acknowledged his activism312 and commented that 
"one of the advantages of being an Article III judge with a lifetime 
appointment is that you never have to say you are sorry."313 The 
vision, however, was Epstein's314 who devised the partial takings doc-
trine a decade ago and recognized that implementing the Takings 
Project would require judicial activism of an unprecedented nature. 
308 See id. at 1575 (Neis, C.J., dissenting). "Value is not a property value under Florida law or 
any state law that I can uncover." ld. (Neis, J., dissenting). 
309 According to Epstein, "each and every dollar" of value is a property right subject to 
compensation under the Takings Clause. EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 199. 
310 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 106-38 (1977). It is perhaps an 
overstatement to say that Penn Central established a "rule" that regulations that diminish 
property value by less than 90% do not require compensation under the Takings Clause. After 
all, Penn Central established a balancing test of three factors and "effect on property value" is 
only one of the three factors. See id. Nonetheless, Penn Central and its progeny strongly 
suggest that regulations that reduce property value by less than 90% will not be takings unless 
one of the other factors (the property owner's "distinct investment backed expectations" and 
the "character of the government action") weigh strongly in the property owner's favor. See id.; 
see also Concrete Pipe Prods. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for So. CaL, 508 
U.S. 602, 543-45 (1993). If not a rule, then it is at least a "rule of thumb" that provides guidance 
to government officials. 
311 See Blumm, supra note 48, at 173. 
312 See Jay Plager, Takings Law and Appellate Decision Making, 25 ENVT'L L. 161, 162~3 
(1995) (acknowledging that the partial takings issue had not been "fully briefed and argued," 
and explaining that sometimes you have a "problem of trying to fit the issue you want to write 
about to the case that is before you"); Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568 ("Nothing in the language 
of the Fifth Amendment compels a court to find a taking only when the Government divests 
the total ownership of the property."). 
313 Plager, supra note 312, at 163. 
314 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 30. 
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Florida Rock is "an extremely destabilizing decision, exposing all 
wetlands regulation, indeed all environmental and land use regula-
tion, to compensation claims."315 After Florida Rock, in the Federal 
Circuit, every time a regulation decreases the value of property, the 
government may be held liable for monetary damages. It does not 
require much imagination to realize that such a monetary burden 
could seriously hamper, if not completely forestall, attempts to regu-
late against environmental harms.316 And that is precisely what Ep-
stein and Judge Plager intended. As Chief Judge Nies noted in dis-
sent, "the objective of the [partial takings] theory is to preclude 
government regulation precisely because regulation will entail too 
great a cost."317 
Florida Rock is also destabilizing because it exponentially in-
creases the line drawing problems that already plague takings law. 
Without Penn Central's threshold determination,318 land use regula-
tors are left attempting to apply Judge Plager's newly-minted "judi-
cial balancing" test to every attempt to regulate land use. While Judge 
Plager predicts that "[0 ]ver time ... the line [between compensable 
partial takings and mere diminutions] will more clearly emerge," 
there is no reason to think his balancing test, which asks whether "the 
government has acted in a responsible way, limiting the constraints 
on property ownership to those necessary to achieve the public pur-
pose, and not allocating to some individuals, less than all, a burden 
should be borne by all,"319 will be any easier to apply than the balanc-
ing test Justice Brennan articulated in Penn Central. Indeed, there 
is every reason to believe that Florida Rock, if followed by other 
courts, will make the "takings muddle"320 infinitely worse. 
In summary, Judge Plager's opinion in Florida Rock relies on the 
pro-developer sentiment and irrelevant dicta of Justice Scalia in Lu-
cas to support a partial takings theory that is inconsistent with a 
315 See Blumm, supra note 48, at 180. 
316 See Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1575 (Nies, C.J., dissenting) ("it requires little imagination to 
envision the vast sums required for the lost value/use claims if the government must pay for 
mere impairment of rights"). 
317Id. (Nies, C.J., dissenting). 
318 See Blumm, supra note 48, at 173. 
319 Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1571. 
320 See generally Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a 
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984). 
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century of binding Supreme Court precedent and is supported only 
in the work of Richard Epstein. 
2. The Nuisance Exception 
From the Takings Project's inception, the nuisance exception 
loomed as a potential obstacle to the Project's goal of thwarting mod-
ern environmental laws. After all, as structured by the Court in 
Mugler and its progeny, the exception gave legislatures a broad, 
evolving, and fairly open-ended opportunity to define what is and is 
not an injurious use.321 Since all or virtually all modern environmental 
laws have been justified by the legislature as being necessary to pro-
tect the health and welfare of the community, this exception threat-
ened to thwart the Project. Not surprisingly, therefore, the nuisance 
exception has been under attack-first by Professor Epstein and later 
by both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. 
a. Professor Epstein 
In Takings, Professor Epstein proposed a nuisance exception that 
is limited, essentially, to cases of physical invasion of neighboring 
property.322 The starting point for Epstein's nuisance analysis is not 
the legislature's assessment of the impact of a proposed use on the 
community, but rather the common law or natural rights held by a 
land owner and defined in a land owner's title.323 Epstein's argument 
is premised upon his idiosyncratic notion that the interaction between 
the Government and the property owner must be viewed essentially 
as a relationship between private parties.324 To Epstein, a corollary to 
this point is that the state has no independent set of entitlements.325 
As such, in discussing the nuisance exception, Professor Epstein 
draws an analogy between self-defense and the police power: "The 
police power as a ground for legitimate public intervention is, then, 
exactly the same as when a private party acts on its own behalf."326 A 
private individual may act to protect his own property against com-
mon law nuisances-that is, against deliberate acts by a neighboring 
321 See supra Section 1. 
322 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 111. 
323 See id. at 5---{j. 
324 See id. at 112. "All questions of conflict between the state and the individual must be 
decomposed into a complex array of conflicts between various individuals." [d. 
325 See id. at 111. 
326 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 111. 
572 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 25:509 
owner that physically invade the property.327 According to Epstein, 
the nuisance exception "gives the state control over the full catalogue 
of common law wrongs involving force and misrepresentation, delib-
erate or accidental, against other persons," but no more.328 Under his 
theory "the sole function of the police power is to protect individual 
liberty and private property against all manifestations of force and 
fraud."329 
b. The Supreme Court 
In Lucas, Justice Scalia fashioned a nuisance exception that echoes 
Epstein's in important respects.330 He argued that the "prevention of 
harmful use analysis" in prior cases was "merely" the Supreme 
Court's early formulation of the requirement that a regulation must 
advance a legitimate state interest to avoid compensation.331 Thus the 
nuisance analysis in earlier cases did not, according to Justice Scalia, 
describe an exception to the Takings Clause; it does not excuse pay-
ment of just compensation. Rather, control of a nuisance is a necessary 
component of a valid, non-compensable regulation: the "nuisance" 
analysis is necessary but not sufficient to avoid paying compensation. 
Justice Scalia defined a new nuisance exception by reference to the 
principles of nuisance and property law in place at the time a property 
owner purchased the parcel.332 According to Justice Scalia, when new 
regulations deprive a property owner of all economically beneficial 
use, the state must compensate a landowner unless the use regulation 
simply makes explicit limitations that "inhere in the title" of the 
property.333 In his words, compensation would be required for new 
regulations that eliminate all uses of property unless "[t]he use of 
327 See id. 
328 See id. at 112 ("the state can only act to control nuisances"). 
329 Epstein's minimalist notions of the police power are, of course, fundamentally inconsistent 
with the broad and encompassing definition of the police power outlined by the Supreme Court: 
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order-these are some 
of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application of the police power to 
municipal affairs .... The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values 
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within 
the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as 
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,32-33 (1954) (citations omitted). 
330 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
331 See id. at 1023-24. 
332 See id. at 1027. 
333 See id. at 1029. 
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these properties for what are now expressly prohibited purposes was 
always unlawful and ... it was open to the State at any point to make 
the implication of those background principles of nuisance and prop-
erty law explicit."334 Finally, Justice Scalia suggests that he intended 
to limit the category of uses that were always unlawful to those that 
have a direct negative impact on neighboring landowners.335 
Justice Scalia's analysis of the nuisance exception to the Takings 
Clause, thus, is similar in important ways to the exception proposed 
by Professor Epstein: The scope of the nuisance exception is linked 
to the title held by the landowner, and the government's authority is 
bounded, at least in part, by common law principles of nuisance.336 
Justice Scalia's nuisance exception, however, differed from Profes-
sor Epstein's version in two critical ways. The Court in Lucas applied 
the exception to a much smaller category of cases than proposed by 
Professor Epstein and provided a broader exception for ''background 
principles of property and nuisance law" than Epstein envisioned. 
Professor Epstein argued that nuisance control (in his narrow de-
finition of the notion) should be the only excuse for non-compensation 
in all takings cases.337 Justice Scalia in Lucas, on the other hand, 
created his nuisance exception in the narrow context of regulations 
rendering property "valueless" and was explicit that nuisance control 
is necessary to avoid compensation only in this limited category of 
cases.33S For other regulations, the Penn Central test will still apply, 
and Lucas clarifies that Mugler and other "harm prevention cases" 
are still very relevant in applying Penn Central's third prong inquiry 
into the "character of government interest."339 As a result, Lucas does 
nothing to increase the likelihood that the vast majority of regulations 
(that restrict property use but do not render property valueless) will 
be considered a taking. 
334 See id. at 1030. 
335 The two examples Justice Scalia gave of regulations that would not require compensation 
both involved proposed uses that would cause significant spillover costs to neighboring property. 
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29 (discussing a landowner who landfills a lake bed and floods his 
neighbors' property and a corporation operating a nuclear power plant on top of an earthquake 
fault). 
336 See Humbach, supra note 16, at 72 (''What the Supreme Court did in Lucas itself was to 
reassign flat-out a portion of this nation's ultimate environmental and land use authority from 
the legislatures, which traditionally had it, to the courts."). 
337 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 107-13. 
338 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007...{)8; Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers 
Pension Trust for So. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 643-44 (1993). 
339 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
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The second important way the nuisance exception established by 
the Court in Lucas varies from that proposed by Professor Epstein 
is that it refers to limitations in place at the time a property owner 
"obtains title" and suggests that limitations from "property law" as 
well as the common law of nuisance may "inhere in the title." This 
portion of the opinion, interpreted literally, suggests that health, 
safety, and environmental regulations that are in place at the time of 
purchase "inhere" in the title. 
The Court's intent in this regard is uncertain.340 While Scalia sug-
gests in, portions of the Lucas opinion that pre-existing limitations 
may somehow be limited only to principles of state nuisance law,341 
other portions suggest quite clearly that the "principles of property 
and nuisance law" include statutes in effect at the time of purchase. 
For example, Justice Scalia cites the Court's opinion in Board of 
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,342 in explicating the "'existing rules 
or understandings that ... ' define the range of interests that qualify 
for protection as 'property' under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments."343 Roth, in turn, involves property interests that were created 
and defined entirely by state statutes. Similarly, Justice Scalia cites to 
Professor Michelman's classic article on "Property, Utility and Fair-
ness"344 in defining the category of uses that were "always unlaw-
ful."345 In the cited passage, Professor Michelman makes quite clear 
that the exception should extend to uses that are unlawful under 
statutory as well as common law.346 Moreover, as courts and commen-
340 See Lazaras, supra note 248, at 1426 (noting that justices that join an opinion do not 
necessarily join in all the "peripheral suggestions in the opinion" and predicting that Justices 
Kennedy and O'Connor would not join in an opinion that limited the background principles that 
inhere in property title to those principles supplied by judge-made common law). 
341 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 ("A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do 
no more than duplicate the result that could have been 'achieved in the courts-by adjacent 
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or 
by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, 
or otherwise."). 
342 Board of Regents State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) 
343 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030 (citations omitted). 
344 Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). 
345 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. 
346 See Michelman, supra note 344, at 1239-41. Professor Michelman argues that compensation 
is not necessary when "it has been formally declared, or when a tacit understanding has arisen, 
that society reserves the right to preempt the exploitation of a certain narrowly described class 
of resources at any time." [d. at 1240. The declarations and understandings referenced in 
Michelman's article come both from federal and state common law (such as the federal common 
law restriction on private exploitation of navigable waters) and state and federal statutory law 
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tators have noted, there is no basis in logic or precedent for making 
the common law the sole basis for "inherent limitations on title."347 
Picking up on this portion of the Court's opinion in Lucas, numerous 
state and lower federal courts have interpreted Lucas to bar compen-
sation whenever a property owner purchased property with existing 
statutory restrictions on its use.348 Perhaps the most comprehensive 
analysis was undertaken by the New York Court of Appeals in four 
cases decided on the same day in February 1997. The lower court of 
appeals applied Lucas' antecedent inquiry to rule against compensa-
tion for state regulations protecting wetlands,349 preventing develop-
ment on steep slopes,35o and requiring maintenance of lateral-support 
for public highways.30l 
The logic of each of the cases was the same. Lucas requires courts 
make a threshold inquiry into "the rights and restrictions contained 
in a property owner's title."352 Because constitutional law, statutory 
law, and the common law all play a role in defining the rights and 
restrictions applicable to a specific parcel, "a court should look to the 
law in force, whatever its source, when the owner acquired the prop-
erty."353 Where a statutory or common law restriction was in place at 
(such as state zoning laws and liquor licenses and a federal law assuming federal control over 
navigable air space). See id. at 124~1. 
347 See generally Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering Inher-
ent Limitations on Title, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1997). Professor Blais comprehensively examines 
the possible rationales for treating common law principles differently than statutory limitation 
and concludes that none of them support "a limited common law based view of inherent 
limitations on title." Id. at 7; see also Lazarus, supra note 248, at 1426 ("The majority's intima-
tions that the background principles must be supplied by judge-made common law, rather than 
by legislative or regulatory enactment, will probably not survive review in the future."); Daniel 
R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URBAN LAW. 215, 225 (1995) 
("This admission could mean a 'newly enacted' land use regulation 'inheres' in the title and is 
not a per se taking if it was in effect when the landowner purchased her land .... "). 
348 In addition to the cases discussed infra, see Wilson v. City of Louisville, 957 F. Supp. 948, 
956 (W.D. Ky. 1997); Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 370--71 (Iowa 1995); Grant v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995). 
349 See generally Gazza v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 
1041-42 (N.Y. 1997); Basile v. Town of Southampton, 678 N.E.2d 489, 490-91 (N.Y. 1997). 
350 See Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Village of Dobbs Ferry, 678 N.E.2d 870, 870-71 
(N.Y. 1997). 
351 See Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. 1997) 
352 See Kim, 681 N.E.2d at 315. 
353 Id. at 315-16. The Court of Appeals stated in Kim: 
It would be an illogical and incomplete inquiry if the courts were to look exclusively 
to common-law principles to identify the preexisting rules of State property law, while 
ignoring statutory law in force when the owner acquired title. . . . To accept this 
proposition would elevate common law over statutory law, and would represent a 
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the time a parcel was purchased, a property owner cannot thereafter 
assert a takings claim.354 The New York Court of Appeals also noted 
that restrictions in place at the time a parcel is purchased are factored 
into the purchase price. A rule allowing a landowner who acquires 
restricted title to challenge a restriction as a taking would create a 
windfall for subsequent purchasers and "reward land speculation to 
the detriment of the public fisc."355 
As the New York cases and the discussion above demonstrate, the 
Supreme Court's flirtations with Professor Epstein's theories have 
yet to have profound impacts on traditional takings law. There ap-
pears from the Court's opinions in Lucas and other recent cases that 
there are not yet five votes on the Court for adoption of the more 
radical aspects of the Epstein theories. Still, in taking tentative steps 
toward adopting a portion of Epstein's nuisance exception, the Court 
has given Judge Plager and his colleagues a crack in the door. The 
Federal Circuit, in turn, has pushed through the crack to adopt a 
much more robust version of Professor Epstein's nuisance exception. 
c. The Federal Circuit 
In an article discussing the Lucas opmIOn, Professor Epstein 
praised the Court for adopting many of his ideas but harshly criticized 
the Court for the two limitations in the case discussed above.356 Ac-
cording to Epstein, "[i]n order for Justice Scalia's reasoning to work, 
it would have to bring many more forms of land use regulation within 
the Takings Clause .... "357 Only by expanding the category of cases 
where the nuisance exception applied, Epstein declared, can health 
and safety regulations receive "the close scrutiny and swift dispatch 
that most of them so richly deserve."358 Dutifully, in two Federal 
Circuit opinions, Judge Plager has closed (or attempted to close) 
Lucas'two loopholes and has created a nuisance exception far closer 
to that envisioned by Professor Epstein. 
departure from the established understanding that statutory law may trump an incon-
sistent principle of the common law. 
[d. at 315 (citations omitted). 
354 See id. at 316-17 (common law and statutory obligations of lateral support); Anello, 678 
N.E.2d at 870 (steep slope ordinance). 
355 Anello, 678 N.E.2d at 871. 
356 See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of 
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1392 (1993). 
357 [d. 
358 [d. 
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In Loveladies, Judge Plager accomplished the task of interpreting 
Lucas to change regulatory takings law outside of the narrow cate-
gory of regulations that deny "all economically viable use."359 Accord-
ing to Judge Plager, the Lucas opinion constituted a "sea change" in 
regulatory takings law that changed the central question in regula-
tory takings cases to, "simply one of basic property ownership rights: 
within the bundle of rights which property lawyers understand to 
constitute property, is the right or interest at issue, as a matter of 
law, owned by the property owner or reserved to the state?"360 
Judge Plager thus concluded in Loveladies that the Lucas opinion 
replaced Penn Central's three part balancing with a three part analy-
sis through which a regulatory taking may be found if: 
(1) there is a denial of economically viable use of the land;361 
(2) the owner has investment-backed expectations for the land; 
and 
(3) the interest at issue was a property interest vested in the 
owner as a matter of state property law, and not within the power 
of the state to regulate under common law nuisance doctrine.362 
Under Judge Plager's reformulation of Lucas, the inquiry into re-
strictions that inhere in the title is not an "antecedent" inquiry that 
makes application of the Penn Central balancing unnecessary. Rather, 
the inquiry replaces Penn Central's third-prong inquiry into the "gov-
ernment interest" in the regulation. As Judge Plager notes, this mas-
terstroke "removed from regulatory takings the vagaries of the bal-
ancing process, so dependant on judicial perceptions with little 
effective guidance in law."363 What Judge Plager means is that under 
his reformulation of regulatory takings doctrine, the public's interest 
in protecting the environment and in regulating the uses of land is 
simply irrelevant. Rather than balancing competing interests, public 
and private, a court will look only at the title to the property and the 
history of state property law.364 
359 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
300 I d. at 1179. 
361 See id. Judge Plager's phrasing of this new first prong seems deliberately misleading. He 
drops the word "all" from Lucas' "denial of all economically viable use" category and replaces 
it with the ambiguous "denial of economically viable use." Judge Plager's discussion of the prong, 
however, makes it clear that he intends his new three-prong test to apply whenever a regulation 
denies a property owner of an economically viable use. See id. at 1179-80. With that simple 
editing of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas, Judge Plager interpreted Lucas to impact all 
regulatory takings cases. 
362 Id. 
363 See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179. 
364 We note that because the Federal Circuit in Loveladies ultimately ruled that the regulation 
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Judge Plager's opportunity to dismiss the notion that statutory 
laws may inhere in the title of property took a bit longer to material-
ize, and, when it finally did, it required Judge Plager to take on the 
logic and reasoning of two of his own colleagues on the Federal 
Circuit. The case in question was Preseault v. United States,365 a case 
involving the federal Rails-to-Trails Act (RTA) and the impact that 
federal regulation of rail corridors had on the reversionary interests 
held by landowners along a now unused corridor. Beginning in 1920, 
federal regulation prohibited abandonment of rail lines (the condition 
necessary for reversion of conditional interests to original land-
owners) without federal approval.366 By 1979, when the Preseaults 
purchased their parcel, federal regulations sanctioned the temporary 
use of rail corridors as recreational trails.367 Subsequently the Pre-
seaults challenged the use of the rail corridor as a recreational trail, 
alleging that such use amounted to a taking of their reversionary 
interest in the corridor.368 
A split three judge panel of the Federal Circuit found that no taking 
had occurred.369 After first deciding that the government action in 
question was a physical invasion, requiring application of Lucas' per 
se takings analysis, the court turned to applying Lucas' antecedent 
inquiry.370 The court ruled that when the Preseaults purchased the 
reversionary interest in the rail corridor in 1979, the interest was al-
ready conditioned upon federal approval of any abandonment by the 
railroad.371 Because the federal government never sanctioned the 
abandonment of the rail corridor sought by the Preseaults, they had 
no current possessory interest in the rail corridor, and nothing was 
taken from them.372 In other words, the federal statutes in place at 
the time the Preseaults purchased their property inhered in their 
in question deprived Loveladies of all economically viable use of their property, Judge Plager's 
reformulation of Penn Central outside of Lucas' category of per se takings is dictum, dictum, 
which courts, including the Federal Circuit, do not appear to be following. See Broadwater 
Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 1997 WL 428516 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 1997) (applying 
original three-prong Penn Central test to regulatory taking case). 
365 See Preseault v. United States, 66 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated, 66 F.3d 1190 (Fed. 
Cir.), rev'd, 100 F.3d 1525 (1996). 
366 See id. at 1186. 
367 See id. at 1170. 
368 ld. at 1169. 
369 ld. 
370 See Preseault, 66 F.3d at 1174. 
371 See id. at 1180. 
372 ld. 
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title, and the Preseaults could not now challenge the statutory provi-
sions, which further burdened their reversionary interests, as a tak-
ing. 
Like the New York Court of Appeals, the panel justified their ruling 
as "a matter of economic as well as legal common sense."373 The market 
price paid by a subsequent purchaser would reflect the restrictions in 
effect at the time of the purchase, so government compensation for 
the regulation would be a windfall to the subsequent owner. It is the 
first owner that has a takings claim, even after the sale, because the 
first owner received less for the property than he would have, but for 
the restriction.374 
The Federal Circuit did not even wait for the Preseaults to request 
a rehearing; they decided on their own initiative to review the case 
en bane. Judge Plager wrote a plurality opinion vacating the panel's 
decision.375 Judge Plager dismissed the panel's argument about Lucas' 
antecedent inquiry in a single page without even discussing the lan-
guage in Lucas suggesting that the antecedent inquiry should include 
both statutory and common law restrictions or the logic of the panel's 
ruling.376 Instead Judge Plager again relied on dictum from other 
portions of Lucas and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in an earlier 
Supreme Court opinion in the Preseault case377 to conclude that Lu-
cas' antecedent inquiry was limited to state-defined nuisance rules.378 
The combined effect of Judge Plager's opinions in Loveladies and 
Preseault is that, in the Federal Circuit, the nuisance exception and 
Penn Central's consideration of the government's interest in regulat-
ing has been reduced to a very narrow inquiry into whether the 
373ld. at 1176; see Gazza v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 
1043 (N.Y. 1997). 
374 See Preseault, 66 F.3d at 1177. Both the Federal Circuit and the New York Court of 
Appeals concluded that, pursuant to Lucas, the judicial rule should be that takings claims do 
not normally convey with the sale of property. See id. at 1177 & n.6; Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1039 
& n.4. Neither court addressed the issue of whether an existing takings claim may be donated, 
sold, inherited or otherwise assigned. See, e.g., Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1039 n.4. 
376 Because Judge Plager was only able to get three other judges to join his opinion, the 
opinion is not binding precedent in the circuit. 
376 Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1538-39. 
377 Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 20 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The 
majority in Preseault concluded that the Preseaults' takings claim should have been filed in the 
Court of Federal Claims, and declined to address the merits of the Preseaults' case. Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, commented on the merits and suggested that 
a taking may have occurred. See id. at 24. 
378 Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1538 (Fed. Cir.1996). "Much of what the Supreme 
Court said then ... about property rights indicates to the contrary." See id. at 1539. 
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regulated use was a common law nuisance. Coupled with Florida 
Rock's expansion of what can constitute a taking, the Federal Circuit 
has adopted important portions of two of the central tenets of Profes-
sor Epstein's proposed revolution in takings law. 
3. MeanslEnds Analysis 
The final critical element of Professor Epstein's theory-the notion 
courts should apply heightened scrutiny to all regulations affecting 
property to ensure the means used by federal, state, and local gov-
ernments to achieve their regulatory objectives are closely tailored 
to achieve permissible ends-has also begun to work its way into our 
constitutional jurisprudence. Most important is the Supreme Court's 
adoption in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. 
City of Tigard of an Epstein-like scrutiny of the means and ends of 
land use regulation.379 In Takings, Epstein, citing the Supreme Court's 
long-discredited Lochner opinion, argued that the Court should apply 
an intermediate standard of review to land use regulations. In his 
formulation, "[t]he act must have a more direct relation, as a means 
to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate."380 
Professor Epstein suggests that this heightened scrutiny is espe-
cially important for land use restrictions that prevent certain indi-
viduals from engaging in land uses that are open to others.381 Profes-
sor Epstein's central concern is that differential treatment of one 
landowner or set of landowners is a "powerful telltale sign that the 
police power has become a cloak for illegitimate ends."382 Professor 
Epstein suggests that overbroad means for achieving a valid end may 
be a sign that the articulated end is a sham and a cover for an 
illegitimate purpose-taking land without paying for it.333 
In Nollan384 and Dolan386 the Supreme Court has adopted just such 
a means/ends analysis in takings cases involving "exactions''386-and 
has articulated the same concerns in so doing. For example, in Nollan, 
379 See id. at 126-34. 
3BO I d. at 128. 
881Id. 
382 I d. at 133. 
383 See EpSTEIN, supra note 3, at 126-34. 
884 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
885 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1994). For a more complete treatment of 
Nollan and Dolan, see generally Kendall & Ryan, supra note 2. 
386 The term "exactions" encompasses a variety of concessions that municipalities extract from 
landowners who wish to change the use of their land, such as impact fees, the provision of 
services, restrictions on land use, and dedications of land. See Kendall & Ryan, supra note 2, at 
1802-03. 
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Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Coastal Commission could con-
stitutionally have denied the N ollans' requested development permit 
outright without compensation, but then found that the Commission 
could not constitutionally condition the permit on the receipt of an 
easement across the N ollans' property unless there was an "essential 
nexus" between the purpose of the condition and the purpose that 
would be served by prohibiting the proposed development.387 Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, the lack of a nexus showed that the condition "is 
not a valid regulation of land use but an 'out-and-out plan of extor-
tion."'388 The link to Professor Epstein is apparent. 
Similarly, in Dolan, the Court ruled that in addition to the essential 
nexus, there must be a "rough proportionality" between the legiti-
mate state interest (the ends) and the condition (the means).389 This 
refined standard of review requires not just that there be some con-
nection between the ends and the means, but also that the connection 
be quite close-so close in fact that the analysis effectively shifts the 
burden of proof in regulatory takings cases to the government.3OO 
Chief Justice Rehnquist echoed Professor Epstein in suggesting that 
the narrow means/ends analysis is in truth a method for ferreting out 
illegitimate state ends cloaked in the police power.391 
As with other Supreme Court forays into Professor Epstein's the-
ory, the Supreme Court's adoption of Epstein's means/ends scrutiny 
has been less than complete. To date, the Court has only applied its 
nexus and rough proportionality tests to exactions that entail a physi-
cal invasion or require a dedication of private property, and the logic 
of the opinions suggest that the tests will be limited to that context.392 
However, the Supreme Court has recently heard oral argument in 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,393 a case that may shed light upon the 
question of how broadly the Supreme Court will apply Nollan and 
Dolan's heightened scrutiny. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's introduction of the issue has again 
brazened conservative judges on lower federal courts to adopt a more 
387 Nollan, 512 u.s. at 386. 
388 ld. (quoting J.E.D. Assoc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)). 
389 ld. at 391. 
390 See id. at 413-14 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
391 See id. at 387. 
392 See Kendall & Ryan, supra note 2, at 1807"'{)8 n.26, 1812 n.51 (discussing reasons why 
applying Nollan and Dolan outside the realm of physical exactions would be an improper 
extension of the cases). 
393 See Eastern Enterprises v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. granted, Oct. 20, 1997, 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, No. 97-42. 
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expansive version of Epstein's handiwork. In Del Monte Dunes v. City 
of Monterey,394 a 1996 case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied 
Nollan and Dolan's heightened scrutiny to a decision to deny a de-
velopment permit and implied that, as Epstein proposed, heightened 
judicial scrutiny will apply to all land use regulations. 
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Takings Law 1998 
As we noted in introducing the Article, the Takings Project is at a 
critical juncture. In the last ten years, the Supreme Court has intro-
duced many of the notions Professor Epstein promoted in Takings, 
but its steps have been tentative and the Court has yet to adopt (or 
even suggest acceptance 00 the most radical aspects of Professor 
Epstein's theory. These tentative steps and some expansive dicta by 
the Court's most conservative judges have, nonetheless, encouraged 
greater activism by lower federal court judges. Most notably, the 
Federal Circuit in Florida Rock, Loveladies, and Preseault, has 
adopted many of the core elements of Professor Epstein's blueprint 
for the Takings Clause. 
The combined efforts of developers, conservative foundations, non-
profits, and activist conservative judges have thus transformed the 
notion that the Taking Clause represents a barrier to health, safety, 
and environmental law from the theoretical musings of a scholar at 
the fringe of constitutional law into circuit court precedent. Because 
the Supreme Court declined the government's invitation to review 
Florida Rock,395 and because the Federal Circuit has exclusive juris-
diction over most claims stemming from the federal government's 
enforcement of the wetlands provision of the Clean Water Act, the 
habitat protection provision of the Endangered Species Act, and nu-
merous other federal health and environmental laws, these cases are 
already threatening significant federal laws and regulations.396 The 
success the Project has had to date is a lesson to those who questioned 
394 See Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1428~4 (9th Cir. 1996). 
396 While it is always dangerous to read too much into a decision by the Supreme Court not 
to review a case, it seems possible here also to read too little. A petition from the government 
to review as important a takings case as Florida Rock unquestionably got the attention of all 
the justices. At the very least, the decision by the Court not to review the cases would seem to 
indicate that there is some discord among the members of the current Court about the appro-
priate response to Judge Plager's handiwork. 
396 See Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 1997 WL 428516 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 31, 
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whether Epstein's work would have any practical import and a warn-
ing to those who are tempted to conclude that Epstein's more extreme 
notions could never gain acceptance from the Supreme Court. 
In summary, the Takings Project represents a remarkably danger-
ous, open question: will central elements of Professor Epstein's pro-
posal become Supreme Court precedent? This term in Eastern En-
terprises v. Apfel, the Supreme Court may address how expansively 
the means/ends analysis established in Nollan and Dolan will be 
applied. The Federal Circuit's opinions in Preseault, Florida Rock, 
and Loveladies also create conflicts among judicial interpretations of 
the Takings Clause, and make it very likely that the Supreme Court 
will address the questions of partial takings and the scope of nuisance 
exception over the next decade. The direction the Court will take in 
these future opinions is, at present, far from certain. The Takings 
Project appears to have four, but not five, solid and consistent votes 
on the Supreme Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, 
Thomas and O'Connor.397 The most likely fifth vote, Justice Kennedy, 
has a record on takings issues that is both less developed and less 
consistent.398 The fate of the Project thus depends in large part upon 
1997) (reversing a ruling that a 28% diminution in value was not a taking and ruling that, under 
Florida Rock, a court must always evaluate the extent to which a regulation interferes with 
investment-backed alternatives and the character of the Government action before denying a 
takings claim). 
397 A decade ago, Justice O'Connor, joining Justice Stevens' dissent in First English, seemed 
to question the Takings Project's objective of imposing upon government agencies a new and 
burdensome compensation requirement. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (O'Connor, J., joining portions of dissent authored 
by Stevens, J.). Since then, however, Justice O'Connor has been unfaltering in her support for 
the Project. See Parking Ass'n of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1116-18 (1995) 
(O'Connor, J., joining Thomas, J., in dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that 
means/ends scrutiny established in Nollan and Dolan should apply to legislative as well as 
adjudicative determinations); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (O'Connor, J., joining 
majority); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1335 (1994) (O'Connor, J., joining 
Scalia, J., in dissenting from the denial of certiorari) ("[tjo say that this case raises a serious 
Fifth Amendment takings issue is an understatement"); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (O'Connor, J., joining majority); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce 
Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1,20 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (addressing the merits of the Preseault's 
takings claim and suggesting that their claim had merit); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 
483 U.S. 825 (1987) (O'Connor, J., joining majority); see also Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning 
Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (1997) (O'Connor, J., joining Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing that transferable development rights (TDR's) received by a property owner are not 
relevant to whether a taking has occurred). For a more nuanced analysis of each Court member's 
voting on takings cases see Lazarus, supra note 127, at 109-21. 
398 Justice Kennedy was appointed to the Court in 1988, after the Court decided Nollan, First 
English, and Hodel v. Irving. In the cases he has decided since being appointed, he has joined 
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the jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy and the ideology of the next 
several justices appointed to the Court. 
For opponents of the Project, this is not a comfortable position. 
Like Professor Blumm, we think it unlikely that the Supreme Court 
"would want to reverse large-scale social and economic decisions of 
more representative branches of government with no basis in prece-
dent or the history of the Fifth Amendment." But the fact that Judge 
Plager and his colleagues on the Federal Circuit have, as an inferior 
court, managed to write so many of Professor Epstein's ideas into the 
nation's case law without getting immediately reversed, suggests that 
more radical decisions by the Supreme Court advancing the Takings 
Project are at least a possibility. 
B. Conclusion 
We began this Article by asserting that neither the means nor the 
ends of the Takings Project could withstand scrutiny. We now can 
clarify more precisely what we mean. The flaws with the Takings 
Project stem from the Takings Clause itself. If there were a persua-
sive (or even plausible) basis for the Project in the text of the Takings 
Clause, attacking it would be considerably more difficult. As we, and 
a long line of scholars from both sides of the political spectrum, have 
thoroughly documented, however, the words of the clause and the 
intent of its authors simply do not support the result the Project 
seeks. It is particularly significant that prominent conservative schol-
ars such as Robert Bork and Charles Fried, who quite openly support 
many of the objectives of the Project, have felt compelled to join the 
pile of commentators rejecting Professor Epstein's interpretation of 
the text of the Constitution. 
Stripped of any textual grounding, the Takings Project relies on 
judicial activism. It asks conservative judges to find new development 
rights in the Constitution, and does so on behalf of group-develop-
ers-that already do quite well in the political process. At the very 
least, the proponents of the Project must address the reality that they 
are promoting judicial activism on behalf of developers and explain 
why they favor activism to benefit this segment of our society but not 
others. 
the majority in Dolan and Suitum and filed a concurrence in Lucas. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 
1659; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Lazarus, 
supra note 127, at 109-21. 
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This raises the principal concern with the legal foundations and 
congressional supporters of the Takings Project. We do not question 
the sincerity of Senator Hatch's concern for developers, but simply 
cannot see how his support for the Takings Project can be squared 
with his simultaneous attack on judicial activism. Similarly, it may be 
appropriate for the Pacific Legal Foundation to litigate vigorously on 
behalf of developers,399 but PLF's demand that judges broadly inter-
pret the Takings Clause is difficult to reconcile with PLF's simultane-
ous demand that judges narrowly interpret the Equal Protection 
Clause to exclude all forms of affirmative action. 
The problems with the judicial seminars conducted by FREE and 
the activism of the Federal Circuit run somewhat deeper. We can 
think of no good reason why judges need to attend week-long semi-
nars in resort locations hosted by private, ideologically-driven, inter-
est groups. Federal judges need not be cloistered, but there is a line 
that can and should be drawn between these seminars and speaking 
engagements, teaching assignments, award ceremonies and, even, 
perhaps, longer, educational seminars conducted by government a-
gencies or bar associations. The Court's Administrative Office cer-
tainly has the power to draw this line, but if they fail to do so, 
Congress should consider a legislative solution. The integrity of the 
judicial process is too important to allow even the appearance of 
impropriety that attendance at such judicial seminars can create. 
The activism of the Federal Circuit highlights a problem with 
granting a single federal appellate court so much power to shape a 
critical and highly politicized area of constitutional law. The idea of 
organizing portions of the federal appellate system by subject matter, 
rather than by region, is a relatively novel and controversial one.4OO 
Judge Plager, in an article written shortly after he was named to the 
Federal Circuit, argued that the critics of such non-regional, subject 
399 See Oliver Houck, With Charity For All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1470-74, 1544-45 (1984) 
(questioning whether PLF's litigation on behalf of developers qualifies as "public interest law" 
within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) of the United States tax code). 
400 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking 
System,138 U. PA. L. REV.UU (1990); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case 
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court 
Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471 
(1983); Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 745 (1981); Reports 
of the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 
195, 234-36 (1975) ("The Commission has concluded that, on balance, specialized courts would 
not be a desirable solution either to the problems of the national law ... or to the problems of 
regional caseloads."). 
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matter courts rely on "untested assumptions," and proposed that 
commentators "carefully analyze the performance of the Federal Cir-
cuit" to "illuminate the rightness or the wrongness of the concerns 
raised about subject matter based courtS."401 This Article demon-
strates that many of the concerns Judge Plager identified regarding 
subject matter courts-the "polarization or politization around policy 
issues" and the potential that judges may be "more readily controlled, 
or their selection controlled, in some invidious way"402-are valid and 
serious concerns. 
The most often cited advantages of subject matter based appellate 
courts-the need for judges with expertise and the need for uniform-
ity of decision-also do not apply with any particular force to takings 
law.403 Unlike other areas in the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, such as 
patent law or international trade law, takings cases require no par-
ticular expertise or technical background. Takings cases are often 
factually complex, and frequently require a delicate balancing of pub-
lic and private interests, but these are tasks federal district court and 
appellate court judges from around the country are more than qual-
ified to perform. Moreover, because federal district and appellate 
courts already hear takings challenges to state laws, they have expe-
rience and some expertise in such cases. 
Similarly, because takings challenges are constitutional, rather than 
statutory,404 and because state courts and regional federal courts al-
ready interpret the Takings Clause in addressing challenges to state 
and local laws, the Federal Circuit cannot provide any meaningful 
uniformity to takings law. As long as the Federal Circuit's opinions 
conflict with the opinions given to the same constitutional text by 
other state and federal courts, there is no real certainty for land-
owners and federal regulators. Only the Supreme Court can resolve 
401 S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit and the Non-Re-
gional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Searchfor a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 
866-67 (1990). 
402 [d. 
403 See, e.g., Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1003, 1008-4>9 (1991) (discussing the need for judges with expertise in highly specialized 
and technical areas and the need to promote uniformity of decision). 
404 Most of the issues within the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit are statutory, rather than 
Constitutional, and because Congress has granted the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction 
over claims under the statute, the Federal Circuit is the sole interpreter of the statute, subject 
only to the discretionary review of the Supreme Court. See generally Plager, supra note 401, 
at 853-54. 
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conflicting interpretations of the Takings Clause and provide any real 
uniformity or certainty in the interpretation of the Takings Clause. 
In summary, rather than expanding the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit over takings cases as Takings Project advocates are promot-
ing,405 we believe Congress should consider eliminating it. Takings 
challenges against the federal government raise broad and fundamen-
tal questions about the role of government, a citizen's rights and 
responsibilities within a community, and the nature of private prop-
erty. These fundamental challenges probably should be addressed by 
the entire federal judiciary. 
Our final observation goes not to the proponents, but to the natural 
adversaries of the Takings Project. To date, state and local govern-
ment organizations, progressive foundations and non-profit organiza-
tions have made no concerted effort to combat the Takings Project,406 
and, as a result, the Project has been able to progress for the last 
decade without a serious public discussion of the merits of the Pro-
ject's means and ends. If the Project is to be thwarted, it must receive 
more attention from its adversaries,407 and federal, state, and local 
government attorneys must receive assistance in defending laws that 
protect the public health and welfare against constitutional attack. 
The Takings Project may wither under scrutiny, but for that to mat-
ter, the Project must be scrutinized outside of the realm of academic 
law journals and amici briefs. The stakes-our nation's health, safety, 
and environmental laws-are high enough to justify such a coordi-
nated response. 
405 See supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text. 
406 To be clear, a large and effective coalition has formed to oppose property rights legislation, 
including the procedural reform legislation that has been proposed this term. We believe that 
a similarly intense and focused opposition must form to combat all aspects of the litigation 
campaign being waged in the nation's courts. 
407 We suspect, for example, that if Judge Plager was creating rights on behalf of criminal 
defendants or minorities instead of developers, he would be a household name by now. See, e.g., 
H. Lee Sarokin, A Judge Speaks Out, NATION, Oct. 13, 1997, at 15 (Judge Sarokin, one of the 
right's favorite "liberal judicial activists" explains that he "retired from the federal bench ... 
over the politicization (what I characterized as the 'Willie Hortonizating') of the federal judici-
ary."). But we did not find a single newspaper or magazine article discussing Judge Plager's 
activism in takings cases. We also find it hard to believe that Project proponents continue to 
derive political mileage from attacking judicial activism when the activism they are promoting-
the Takings Project-is perhaps the single most significant form of judicial activism to come 
from the federal courts over the last decade. 
